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APPEALING GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS:
REDUCING THE COST AND DELAY OF
PROCUREMENT LITIGATION WITH
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES
ELDON H. CROWELL*
CHARLES POU, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
Within the government contracts community, a small but prom-
ising movement has begun away from a perilous trend of red tape,
proceduralism, and intolerable delay. Most contractors, agency offi-
cials, government attorneys, auditors, inspector generals, and ad-
ministrative judges agree that government contract appeals have
become too complicated, too expensive, and altogether too. time-
consuming.
As with most federal programs, problems stem from more than
a single source and span a wide range of factors. These factors in-
clude, but are not limited to, contracting officers' lack of authority,
overloaded boards of contract appeals (BCAs), and political and or-
ganizational failures. Despite Congress' declared goals in the Con-
tract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA)l to encourage negotiated
settlement by providing an expeditious alternative to court litiga-
tion,2 appeals now rarely are resolved expeditiously or inexpen-
sively in any forum.
Today's appeals system is cumbersome for a number of rea-
sons. Many contracting officers fear being second-guessed by
* Partner, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C. A.B., Princeton University, 1948;
LL.B., University of Virginia, 1951.
** Senior Attorney, Administrative Conference of the United States, Washington,
D.C. B.A., Rice University, 1971; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1974.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable contributions of Diane M. Stock-
ton and Susan Williams in the preparation of this article, and the editorial assistance of
Leslie Allan Lugo in its publication.
1. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
2. "The act's provisions help to induce resolution of more contract disputes by ne-
gotiation prior to litigation .... " S. REP. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5235, 5235.
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superiors, auditors, congressmen, or the press. This fear signifi-
cantly reduces any incentive to take sensible steps to settle a com-
plex or controversial problem. Not surprisingly, this uncertainty
can cause some contractors to prefer simply to appeal a decision
rather than to waste their time negotiating a tenuous settlement. In-
creasingly, management problems are handed over to lawyers and
accountants to be resolved in forums hardly designed for efficiency.
Often, the criteria used are only marginally relevant to the real is-
sues in the dispute, resulting in an ever increasing caseload at many
appeals boards. Most notably, the active docket of the Armed Serv-
ices Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) virtually has doubled since
1979 without a concomitant increase in manpower.3 A common
complaint is that the boards themselves, originally created as a sort
of alternative means of dispute resolution (ADR), have become too
"judicialized." 4 The burdens of traditional litigation, the very situa-
tion the boards were created to avoid, are now virtually inevitable
because of the increased use of depositions, discovery, and opinion
writing. 5
Interest in improving resolution of disputes has risen steadily
since 1972, when the Commission on Government Procurement
recommended that an informal conference be instituted before any
appeal by the contractor to review contracting officer decisions ad-
verse to the contractor.6 The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP) issued a subsequent policy directive which encouraged in-
formal discussions "before issuance of a contracting officer's deci-
sion on a claim, . . . to the extent feasible, by individuals who have
not participated substantially in the matter in dispute, [to] aid in the
"7resolution of differences by mutual agreement ....
3. Williams, A Brief Look at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 22 PUB. CONT.
NEWSL. 3, 17 (1986) (1221 cases in 1979 grew to 2074 by the end of 1985).
4. See Spector, The Contract Disputes Act of 1978-Some Observations and Predictions, 39
FED. B.J. 1 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Crowell, Edelman, Henry, Lemley, Nash, Mandelman & Vander Schaaf,
Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution to Contract Claims, 2 AM. U. ADMIN. L.J. 553, 554 n.7
(1987) [hereinafter Applying ADR] (statement of Eldon H. Crowell).
6. 124 CONG. REc. 36,264 (1978). This review would have been conducted at the
request of the contractor by a high-level agency official who previously had not been
involved in the claim. Although both the House and Senate draft versions contained
this provision, it was dropped from the Act at the last minute. Senator Byrd explained
that "[i]t is still the policy of Congress that contractor claims should be resolved by
mutual agreement, in lieu of litigation, to the maximum extent possible. [The provision
was dropped, however, because of concerns that] . . . contractors will use this statutory
authority for a meeting with supervisors of the contracting officer to undermine the ne-
gotiating position of the contracting officer." Id. at 36,267.
7. 45 Fed. Reg. 31,035 (May 9, 1980); see also Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48
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In this spirit, a few agencies began experimenting in the mid-
1980s with several alternative means of dispute resolution, includ-
ing minitrials, mediation, and settlement conferences. Consistent
with the goals of the CDA, these methods have proven to be effi-
cient and fair ways to resolve a variety of contractual and other pri-
vate disputes. One significant factor which has helped agencies to
accomplish this result is the involvement of the actual decision-
makers, rather than their representatives, in the conflict resolution
process.
Part I of this study surveys the growth of government contract
appeals from a historical perspective and highlights the current
rules applicable to resolving contract disputes. Part II focuses on
the actual and potential application to contract appeals of the most
commonly used ADR methods, particularly the minitrial, and also
mediation, settlement judges, arbitration, dispute review boards,
summary procedure, and case management. For each method, the
advantages and disadvantages are analyzed and examples are given.
Part III of this study analyzes the implementation of ADR in govern-
ment contract appeals, and points to various changes that must oc-
cur in agency policies, rules, and contract statutes to make ADR an
effective option for the speedy disposition of contract appeals.
This study is not intended to reverse the recent trend toward
judicialization, but rather to explore the uses of one possible set of
options available to help reduce the formality of some proceedings.
Even given the impressive success rate in the relatively few cases to
date which have used ADR, it would be naive to suggest that ADR
methods are panaceas or that they will work in most contract ap-
peals. Their use presents serious, unresolved issues in some cases.
Nevertheless, we can benefit from examining agencies' experiences,
describing what happened and why, exploring some of the practical
and legal questions raised, and recommending procedures to make
life easier and more productive for those who do choose to engage
in ADR.
I. CONTRACT APPEALS: A BRIEF LOOK AT THE LANDSCAPE
A. Background. The Growth of Contract Appeals
Today's system for handling contract disputes has its origins in
much earlier times in which the problems and processes were sim-
pler. In 1855, the first general legislation was enacted that permit-
C.F.R. § 33.204 (1988) (stating "Government's policy to try to resolve all contractual
issues by mutual agreement at the contracting officer's level, without litigation").
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ted monetary claims against the federal government in a newly
created Court of Claims.' During the Civil War, Secretary of War
Simon Cameron appointed what was probably the first board to
hear contract claims. The function of this board was to hear and
decide certain claims under ship construction contracts awarded by
a chief quartermaster who was found to have committed fraud
against the government.9 Subsequently, many government con-
tracts explicitly allowed contractors to appeal a government contract
official's decision to the agency head.1"
In the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars, the first
formal appeal procedures were established. In 1918, a Board of
Contract Adjustment was established in the War Department. This
Board, comprised of seven army officers and fifteen eminent civilian
attorneys, was created to resolve contract disputes that had not been
disposed of by mutual agreement." In some of the cases which the
Board resolved, trial-type hearings were conducted, complete with
verbatim transcripts. Before dissolution early in 1922, this Board
and its successor disposed of over three thousand cases.' 2 Unlike
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels was not a lawyer. Daniels took a considerably different ap-
proach by establishing a Compensation Board to avoid "'con-
ducting interviews and hearings which were taking considerable
[amounts] of his time and patience.' ,,1" The Navy Board consisted
of naval officers experienced in engineering, management, and ac-
8. The court (now the United States Claims Court) continuously has had jurisdic-
tion over contract and other claims since its creation, first as a place of appeal from
agency decisions, and now, more or less, on a par with the agency boards of contract
appeals. Much of the early history described herein is set forth in considerable detail by
Joel P. Shedd, Jr., Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (1964).
9. Id. at 42. The three-commissioner board went to the Western Military District,
examined proofs of claims, and made recommendations to the Secretary on all claims in
which payment had been suspended. Id. The Secretary's authority was upheld in 1868
when the Court of Claims refused to entertain a claim for the unpaid balance on the
contractor's initial claim following payment of a part at the commissioners' recommen-
dation. See Adams v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 70 (1866), rev'don other grounds, 74 U.S. 463
(1868), which upheld the Secretary's authority to appoint a board, with the proviso that
claimants had the option whether or not to consent to use a board.
10. Shedd, supra note 8, at 44.
11. Id. at 45. Civilian members' salaries were $7,500 per year, then equal to those of
senators and congressmen, and more than judges of the Court of Claims received. Id. at
45-46.
12. According to Professor Wigmore, the Board's opinions were "models of clarity."
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4(c), at 74 (3d ed. 1940).
13. Shedd, supra note 8, at 46-47 (quoting the Report for Under Secretary of War
dated May 28, 1942) (footnote omitted).
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counting "with sufficient rank and experience to command the re-
spect of senior officials or contractors." 14 This Board of technical
experts operated continuously until the Navy Department Board of
Contract Appeals replaced it in 1944.'" This Board, in turn, ulti-
mately was subsumed into the ASBCA in 1949.16
The number and size of government contracts continued to
grow in the period following World War II, as did their importance
to the nation's economy. Additional agencies began establishing
boards both to lighten the burden on top officials and to give con-
tractors an option of avoiding the cost and delay of litigation in the
courts. By the early 1960s, without any authorizing legislation,
nearly a dozen agencies had created boards.
17
Until the early 1960s, proceedings before the BCAs were infor-
mal and relatively expeditious.'" In most cases, there was little or
no discovery, and the hearings that were conducted more closely
resembled the model of arbitrations than court trials. Members of
the government contracts bar usually presented a scaled-down ver-
sion of their case before the boards. The assumption underlying this
strategy was that if the contractor lost at the board level, he or she
would be able to obtain a full-scale de novo trial on the merits
before the United States Court of Claims.' 9
In 1963, the Supreme Court put a halt to this practice with its
decision in United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co." 0 The Court held that
findings of fact by a BCA on disputes arising under a government
contract were final and binding, subject only to judicial review on
the administrative record in the Court of Claims.2' The Court ruled
that a de novo hearing on the merits would no longer be available in
the Court of Claims, no new evidence would be received or consid-
ered, and the boards were thus the sole forum for trying disputes
arising under the remedy-granting clauses of the contract.22 The
Court reaffirmed this conclusion in United States v. Utah Construction
14. Id. at 47.
15. Id. at 56.
16. For a detailed look at the creation of the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals (ASBCA), see id. at 50-60.
17. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, STATISTICAL DATA RE-
LATING TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED BY FEDERAL AGENCIES, CLASSIFIED
INDEX 78-79 (1962).
18. Applying ADR, supra note 5, at 554 n.7 (statement of Eldon H. Crowell).
19. Id.
20. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
21. Id. at 713-18.
22. Id.; see Spector, Is It "Bianchi's Ghost" or "Much Ado About Nothing"?, 29 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 90 (1964).
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& Mining Co.23 In Utah Construction, the Court held that the Court of
Claims would continue to be the exclusive forum for contractor
claims based upon breach of contract.24
In the wake of Bianchi and Utah Construction, the boards were left
with no choice but to take on a far more significant role in the reso-
lution of government contracts disputes. This led to pressure by the
government contracts bar to "judicialize" procedures before the
boards in an effort to obtain and guarantee procedural due pro-
cess." The hearings on the merits became more formalized and ex-
tensive.26 This judicialization led to an increase in caseloads and
backlogs, more heavily lawyered disputes, and the introduction and
expansion of discovery and motions practice. More and more deci-
sions took longer to be reached and read. Many applauded these
trends as enhancing contractors' due process rights, while many
other viewers decried them as inducing delay, bureaucratic irre-
sponsibility, and litigation expenses.27
Whatever the merits of the various viewpoints, the judicialized
model of claims resolution ultimately prevailed. In 1978, Congress
enacted the CDA, due in large part to agitation by some private bar
and board members and a few court decisions finding broad due
process rights. 28 Among other things, the CDA gave the boards a
statutory basis for their existence, enhanced the independence and
authority of board judges (as well as the finality of their decisions),
and prescribed exclusive dispute resolution procedures.29
B. The Current Rules: The Contract Disputes Act
1. Background. In 1978, Congress enacted the CDA30 to bring
greater consistency, fairness, and efficiency to the resolution of dis-
putes arising out of government contracts."' The legislation largely
reflected the recommendations of the Commission on Government
Procurement, a commission created by Congress in 1969 whose
23. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
24. Id. at 420.
25. Spector, Public Contract Claims Procedures-A Perspective, 30 FED. B.J. 1, 5 (1971).
26. Id. at 8.
27. Id. at 6.
28. See Applying ADR, supra note 5, at 554 (statement of Eldon H. Crowell).
29. See infra text pp. 188-90.
30. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
31. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK (1985) [hereinafter ADM. PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK]; see
also J. CIBINIC, JR. & R. NASH, JR., GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CLAIMS 610-32 (1981); E.
CROWELL, R. BOYD & W. JOHNSON, THE CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT OF 1978, at 1 (Fed.
Pub. 1979).
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function was to recommend improvements in the procurement
process. 2
2. Agency Procedures. The statutory system established by the
CDA is applicable to all executive branch agencies. It begins with
the contracting officer, an agency official whose function is to enter
into and administer government contracts.33 Any claim arising out
of a contract is to be presented to the contracting officer. 34 This
creates a dual, potentially conflicting, role for the- contracting of-
ficer: the contracting officer is not only to represent the govern-
ment as a party to the contract, but also (subject to certain
decisional safeguards) is to make the decisions on claims.35 If the
dispute is not resolved amicably, the CDA requires the contracting
officer to issue a written decision on the claim. This decision must
state both the reasons for the decision and inform the contractor of
available appeal rights.3 6
A contractor who is dissatisfied with a contracting officer's deci-
32. Efforts to pass contract disputes legislation began after the Commission on
Governmental Procurement issued its final report and recommendations in
1973 and reached fruition in October of 1978. H.R. 11002 was introduced by
Representatives Harris (D. Va.) and Kindness (R. Ohio) on February 20, 1978
and reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee without hearings.
(The Commission had held hearings on similar legislation the previous year).
The House passed the bill on September 26, 1978. A similar Senate bill, S.
3178, was introduced by Senators Chiles (D. Fla.), Packwood (R. Ore.), Heinz
(R. Pa.) and DeConcini (D. Ariz.) on June 7, 1978 and favorably reported, with
amendments, by the Committees on Governmental Affairs and the Judiciary.
The Senate took up floor consideration of the bill on October 12, agreeing to
amendments that exempted the Tennessee Valley Authority from certain of the
Act's requirements, added the requirement that claims of $50,000 or more be
certified, deleted a requirement that an informal settlement conference be af-
forded contractors, and changed the standard ofjudicial review of contract ap-
peals board decisions from "clearly erroneous" to "substantial evidence,"
among other things. The Senate then passed H.R. 11002, amended to contain
the amended provisions of S. 3178, and the House agreed to the Senate-passed
version the next day.
Perhaps because it was passed quickly, at the end of the legislative session,
the Contract Disputes Act (including the Senate Amendments to it) was not the
subject of extensive debate. However, the Congressional Record for October
12 does include a brief explanation of the amendments agreed to on the floor.
ADM. PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at 283 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 281.
34. Id. at 281-82.
35. Id. at 282. The term "claim" is not defined, but includes disputes arising during
contract performance (involving, for example, the interpretation of contract terms or
requests for equitable adjustments to the contract price) and claims for breach of con-
tract. It does not include bid protests or proceedings for the disbarment or suspension
of government contractors. Id. at 281.
36. Id. at 282.
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sion on the claim may appeal the decision either to an agency BCA
or directly to the United States Claims Court. "At this stage of the
dispute, a more formal adversary proceeding begins."'3'  Following
a second unsatisfactory result, the contractor may then appeal the
decision of either body to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. 38
3. Other Provisions. In addition to establishing a single compre-
hensive law covering the contract disputes process for almost all
government contracts, the CDA made several other important
changes. For the first time the Act gave a statutory basis to the
BCAs, expanded their jurisdiction, authorized them to grant any re-
lief within the authority of the Claims Court,3 9 and gave them sub-
poena power.40  For the purpose of enhancing the quality and
independence of the boards, the CDA added new requirements for
the selection of contract appeals board members.4 1 It also directed
the OFPP to issue guidelines for the establishment and procedures
of agency contract appeals boards.42
C. Surveying the Disputes Landscape: Why, What, and How?
1. Why So Many Disputes?-For a variety of reasons, the
number and frequency of controversies that remain between the
parties requiring resolution by BCAs has increased. These include:
-Historical reasons, such as the growing impact of government
37. Id.
38. Id. This court was established and given jurisdiction over contract appeals as
well as certain other appeals involving the United States by the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. Before passage of this law, the United
States Court of Claims heard appeals from contract appeals board cases as well as origi-
nal appeals from contracting officer's decisions.
39. 41 U.S.C. § 607 (1982).
40. Id. § 610.
41. See id. § 607(b).
The CDA requires contract appeals boards to provide for accelerated disposi-
tion of cases involving claims of $50,000 or less.... (Jurisdiction of U.S. dis-
trict courts over small claim contract disputes was eliminated.) These
procedures are intended to encourage the use of the agency boards, rather
than the Claims Court, for minor disputes.
ADM. PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at'282.
42. 41 U.S.C. § 607(h) (1982). The model rules developed pursuant to this mandate
appear in the Adminitrative Procedure Sourcebook, as do cites to individual boards' proce-
dural rules. In addition, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has issued a
policy directive setting forth procedures for the handling of claims by agency con-
tracting officers and the text of a disputes clause to be included in government contracts.
OFPP Policy Letter 80-3, reinted in ADM. PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at
331.
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contracting;4 3 increased complexity of contracts; new auditing and
other regulatory requirements; and an expanded notion-perhaps
overexpanded-of necessary due process rights;
-More contractors have developed a dependence on the gov-
ernment for their existence;
-There is an increased willingness to resort to litigation
among many contractors and an expanding government contracts
bar;
-There is an increasing public division or controversy over the
wisdom of some kinds of expenditures (e.g., some defense spending)
which often is vented peripherally in controversies over contract or
administrative decisions;
-Increased scrutiny by many congressional sources may dis-
courage contracting officers or their supervisors from risking close
calls, taking on politically sensitive cases or handling "hot
potatoes;"
-The establishment (or expansion) of intra-agency audit of-
fices and inspectors general, and statutes or rules enhancing their
authority, has served to inhibit settlement of disputes and limit deci-
sional flexibility.
The combined result of these factors has been a reduced will-
ingness or ability of contracting officials to exercise responsibility,
and an increased doubt in some quarters that the contracting of-
ficers truly act to serve the government's best interest.44 One
knowledgeable observer sees an environment "where management
seems willing to throw their difficult problems into the litigation mill
rather than work them out at a management level."45
Dissatisfaction with many agencies' contracting processes and
methods of dispute resolution is increasing.46 The focus of much of
43. According to the Census Bureau, the dollar value of federal contracting rose by
approximately $66 billion (to $196.3 billion) from 1981 to 1987. UNITED STATES BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, FEDERAL EXPENDITURES BY STATE FOR 1987, at 43 (1988).
44. See Bednar &Jones, The DOD Contracting Officer, 1987 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CONT. L. 1;
see also PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION, A Quest for Excellence, FINAL REPORT BY THE
PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT (June 1986) (recom-
mending standards of conduct for defense contractors).
45. R. Nash, Jr., A New Technique for Settling Disputes-The "Mini Trial" (1985)
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
46. In 1966, one knowledgeable observer commented, "[i]n recent years contractor
complaints of delay in receiving ASBCA decisions were rare indeed." Shedd, supra note
8, at 60. An understated view two decades later held that "in the past few years the
[dispute resolution] process seems to have been gradually slowing down." R. Nash,
supra note 45; see also letter from David Schwartz, Director, Multinational Legal Services
(MLS), to Robert B. Bedell, Administrator, OFPP (Mar. 31, 1987) ("Litigated contract
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this dissatisfaction is on the various BCAs to which agencies and
contractors turn after failing to resolve their disputes. Many of the
broad criticisms are unreflective, and one should bear in mind that
judges, boards, caseloads, and work habits vary enormously. The
unhappiness among many contractors, lawyers, and agency officials,
nevertheless, is based upon accurate perceptions that these disputes
often are unnecessarily contentious and their resolution needlessly
complex, drawn out, and, therefore, very costly to both sides.
2. What Kinds of Cases?-Because all acquisition disputes under
agency programs involve contracts, they are far more homogeneous
than are cases before the federal district courts. While each agency,
with its unique program assortment, board, and caseload, has its
own characteristics, generalizations as to typical contract disputes
may be helpful. For example, the Veterans Administration Board of
Contract Appeals handles primarily claims and disputes arising
under construction contracts for VA hospitals. The Army Corps of
Engineers Board (Corps BCA) processes domestic and international
construction disputes arising under Corps contracts. The largest
board, the ASBCA, decides a wide range of Department of Defense
(DoD) procurement disputes. These disputes often include resolv-
ing technical issues regarding specifications for state-of-the-art
equipment, engineering issues arising under construction contracts,
and complex accounting issues associated with claims by the gov-
ernment under the Truth in Negotiations Act.4 7 Similar to the
Corps BCA, the ASBCA also hears appeals on behalf of other agen-
cies. The General Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) has
jurisdiction not only over disputes arising out of GSA supply sched-
ule contracts, but also appeals under contracts for automatic data
processing equipment pursuant to the Brooks Act.4" Under the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984,49 the GSBCA has jurisdic-
tion to resolve bid protests brought by disappointed bidders under
federal automatic data processing contracts.
3. How ?-BCAs and Their Procedures.-The boards, their rules,
and the matters that they decide hardly are uniform, but they do
disputes have, to put it bluntly, all but swamped the overburdened boards of contract
appeals and the U.S. Claims Court. Complaints of long delays, with attendant severe
client hardships, are heard frequently.") (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
47. See 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1988).
48. 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1982).
49. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified at scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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have enough in common that the following description is broadly
illustrative.
Pursuant to authority granted by section 8(h) of the CDA,50 the
OFPP at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has promul-
gated proposed uniform rules of procedure for the BCAs.5  The
boards generally have adopted these uniform rules, although each
board has made minor modifications to suit its type of cases and
caseload.52 For example, the procedures followed by the ASBCA
are a combination of statutory provisions under the CDA and the
proposed uniform rules. They are as follows:
Appeals. If a contractor wishes to appeal the final decision of the
contracting officer, the contractor must file with the ASBCA written
notice of appeal within ninety days of receipt of the decision.53
Appeal File. Within thirty days of receipt of the appeal, the con-
tracting officer must file with the ASBCA pertinent documents relat-
ing to the dispute. These documents include the contracting
officer's final decision, the contract and specifications, pertinent cor-
respondence, and other relevant documents.54 The final collection
of all of these documents is commonly referred to as the "Rule 4
File."
Complaint. Within thirty days of docketing the appeal by the
ASBCA, the contractor must file the complaint setting forth the ba-
sis for and amount of the claim.5 5 The government's answer is due
within thirty days after receipt of the complaint.5 6
Written Discovery. The ASBCA encourages cooperation between
the parties in exchanging written and documentary discovery.57 The
ASBCA rules provide that responses to interrogatories, requests for
admission, and requests for production of documents are due within
forty-five days after service.58
Depositions. The ASBCA's rules do provide for depositions. 59
The deposition practice before the ASBCA has become nearly as
extensive as in typical court litigation.
50. 41 U.S.C. § 607(h) (1982).
51. See OFFP Rules of Procedure, Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 101-110.
52. E. CROWELL, R. BOYD & W. JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 61.
53. 41 U.S.C. § 606 (1982).
54. ASBCA Rules of Practice 4, Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 185.50.
55. ASBCA Rules of Practice 6(a), Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 185.70.
56. ASBCA Rules of Practice 6(b), Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 185.70.
57. ASBCA Rules of Practice 14(a), Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 186.90.
58. ASBCA Rules of Practice 15, Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 1187.
59. ASBCA Rules of Practice 14, Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 186.90; see also 41 U.S.C.
§ 610 (1982).
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Subpoenas. Pursuant to section 11 of the CDA, the ASBCA has
the power to issue subpoenas compelling testimony in deposition or
at trial.6" Further, subpoenas may be issued compelling the produc-
tion of documents. 6'
Hearings. Hearings are conducted before one ASBCA member
and a written transcript of the hearing is produced. Rule 20 of the
ASBCA provides that hearings "shall be as informal as may be rea-
sonable and appropriate under the circumstances. 62 The ASBCA's
rules do refer to the Federal Rules of Evidence, but admissibility of
evidence is left to "the sound discretion of the presiding administra-
tive judge.' '63
Decisions. After the hearing, the parties customarily submit si-
multaneous post hearing briefs. 6' The ASBCA then issues a deci-
sion in writing signed by the ASBCA member who conducted the
hearing and the other members of his or her panel.65
Small Claims. For claims under $50,000, the ASBCA's rules pro-
vide for an accelerated procedure so that the decision will be ren-
dered within 180 days of the notice of appeal.66 For claims under
$10,000, the ASBCA offers an even more streamlined "expedited"
procedure so that the decision will be rendered within 120 days.67
II. ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING CONTRACT APPEALS
A. Will ADR Work?
While the widespread dissatisfaction over the growth and con-
sequences of contract disputes is obvious, solutions to the existing
problems are not. Several remedies have been recommended for
dealing with the problems encountered. Some of the suggestions
include marginal revisions of the boards, 61 increased professional-
ization of contracting officers, and overall structural changes in the
ways in which agencies conduct business. Some believe that it
makes much more sense to have one board, or at most two (one
60. 41 U.S.C. § 610 (1982).
61. Id.
62. ASBCA Rules of Practice 20, Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 187.50.
63. Id.
64. See ASBCA Rules of Practice 23, Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 187.70.
65. ASBCA Rules of Practice 28, Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 188.30.
66. ASBCA Rules of Practice 12.1(b), Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 186.40.
67. ASBCA Rules of Practice 12.1(a), Cont. App. Dec. (CCH) 186.40; see also 41
U.S.C. § 608(a) (1982).
68. See Churchill, Report of the Federal Contract Claims and Remedies Committee on Ways of
Expediting Appeals Before the Board of Contract Appeals, 16 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 161, 177-78
(1986) (recommending that the boards hire more judges and support staff).
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military-ASBCA, and the other civilian), than to have many small
ones.6 9 While these proposals may have some merit, this study will
not discuss them.
The cluster of methods that have come to be known as "alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution" are regarded by many people
within and without of the government contracts community as par-
ticularly appropriate means of resolving many questions that arise in
government contract claims.7" While some see ADR as merely a
"fad" and question its specific utility in government disputes,7' l
these methods have helped and continue to successfully help re-
solve private conflicts which raise questions similar to those heard
by BCAs. This study's main contention is that it is time for all major
contracting agencies, and those individuals who deal with them, to
explore seriously the potential uses for ADR, and to begin creating
an atmosphere in which these methods can be more readily em-
ployed. Before specific issues involved in the integration of ADR
methods into the government contracting process are addressed, it
is necessary to decide whether they are worth the effort. The answer
is not obvious to everyone. Skeptics have raised concern over agen-
cies' use of some ADR processes. These skeptics worry that ADR
will reduce the accountability of government officials for their deci-
sions. Some of them fear that widespread use of ADR merely will
add another layer of "time-consuming and wasteful techniques in
return for minimal (if any) reductions in the alleged delay and cost
of resolving a relatively small number of contract disputes."72 A
judge similarly expressed concern that resolving many disputes
69. See E. CROWELL, R. BOYD & W. JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 52.
70. E.g., Korthals-Ahes, The Applicability of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques to
Government Defense Contract Disputes, reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 147 (1986) [hereinafter ADR SOURCEBOOK]; letter from David Schwartz to
Robert B. Bedell, supra note 46 ("Among all the disputes to which the Government is a
party, contract disputes are perhaps the most appropriate for resolution by ADR....
[C]ontract disputes are primarily disputes about money, more or less involving disputed
facts ... with few questions of credibility of witnesses .... ADR is the future of govern-
ment contract litigation.").
71. For the various arguments concerning alternative means of dispute resolution
(ADR), see ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 77, 101; Edwards, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986).
72. Letter from Stuart Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
Department of Justice, to Marshall J. Breger, Chairman, Administrative Conference
(Nov. 13, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review). One need not be a skeptic to
recognize that ADR is "one of those subjects that receives almost universal endorsement
in theory but substantially less in practice." Millhauser, The Unspoken Resistance to Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 29, 29 (Jan. 1987).
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through ADR will produce no precedent which may, in turn, under-
mine the predictability that aids the government's competitive bid-
ding system, heighten contract costs, and increase uncertainty and
disputes.7 3 A few even maintain that a system that shifts the major-
ity of potentially controversial or difficult decisions to judges, ac-
countants, technicians, or others who are involved less directly in
managing government contracts, is, and should be, preferred by
agency officials.
Two crucial questions are presented. First, do these concerns
loom so large as to render ADR ineffective or harmful and thus un-
supportable in contract claims? Second, how can these concerns be
mitigated in practice without sacrificing the unique aspects that
make ADR valuable?
Many knowledgeable observers have remarked on govern-
ment's potential uses of ADR. 74 The Administrative Conference,
for instance, has studied issues in governmental dispute resolution
and repeatedly has recommended that agencies make greater use of
mediation, negotiation, minitrials, and similar means to reduce the
delay and contentiousness which needlessly accompany many
agency decisions. 75 The Conference has twice formally called for
legislation which authorizes agencies to agree to use voluntary,
binding arbitration in limited classes of contract and other dis-
putes.76 Numerous articles and reports, including several prepared
for the Conference, have demonstrated that mediation, negotiated
rulemaking, and similar methods have produced sound agency deci-
sions while at the same time avoiding much of the formality and cost
73. Letter from Judge John Corcoran, Veterans Administration Board of Contract
Appeals (VABCA), to Marshall J. Breger, Chairman, Administrative Conference (Nov.
16, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
74. "In the long term, lawyers, particularly government lawyers, must de-emphasize
their adversarial behavior and give greater weight to solving and negotiating. A central
challenge of the legal profession is to resolve controversies before they escalate into
major disputes or proceed to a full hearing." Burns, A View From the Justice Department, 2
AM. U. ADMIN. L.J. 441 (1987); see also Hatch, A View From Congress, 2 AM. U. ADMIN. L.J.
427 (1987); Smith, Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution: Practices and Possibilities in the
Federal Government, 1984 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 70, at 163.
75. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1989) (recommending use of a variety of ADR methods
on a voluntary basis); id. §§ 305.82-4, .85-5 (recommending procedures for negotiated
rulemaking); id. § 305.84-4 (EPA should emphasize negotiation in CERCLA hazardous
waste site cleanups); id. § 305.82-2 (informal action should form the core of federal
grant dispute resolution).
76. Id. §§ 305.87-5, .86-3. These regulations also address procedural safeguards
and appropriate subjects for agency arbitrators.
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of standard processes.77 The agency officials who have first hand
experience with ADR, 78 and others who have been involved, have
exhibited considerable enthusiasm. Outside the governmental con-
text, testimonials to ADR's applications have become so common-
place that some worry about overselling it.79  More importantly,
many government contract cases resemble those others in which
ADR has been applied successfully.80 Even recognizing that most of
77. See A. ADAMS &J. FIGUEROA, EXPEDITING SETTLEMENT OF EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES
IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR: AN EVALUATION OF THE MSPB's APPEALS ARBITRATION PROCE-
DURE (Jan. 1985) (report to the Administrative Conference); G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (1986); Anderson, Negotiation and
Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superf~nd, 1985 DUKE LJ. 261; Barrett, Mediation and
Adjudication: The Double Track Approach, 30 FED. B. NEWS &J. 436 (1983), reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 527; Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures and the Administrative Process, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 165 (1986), sections reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 239, 309, 437, 593, 625; Perritt, Analysis of Four Negotiated Rulemaking Efforts, in
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS
637 (1986); Smythe, The Reparations Program of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission:
Reducing Formality in Agency Adjudication, 2 AM. U. ADMIN. L.J. 39 (1987).
78. See Applying ADR, supra note 5, at 563-66, 571-73 (remarks of Jack K. Lemley,
Ralph H. Nash, and DerekJ. Vander Schaaf); Edelman & Carr, The Mini-Trial: An Alter-
native Dispute Resolution Procedure, 42 ARB.J. 7 (1987), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 231; Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The History, Needs and
Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393 (1983-84), reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 119; Office of the Inspector General, DoD, Tennessee-Tom-
bigbee Claim Settlement [hereinafter Tenn-Tom Claim Settlement Report] (report of investiga-
tion July 29, 1987), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 583; R. Nash, supra
note 45.
79. See Rich, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Opening Doors to Settlement, CHEM. WEEK,
Aug. 14, 1985, at 28, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 71; Millhauser, Rush
to Mediation: Where Is the Bandwagon Going?, Legal Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at 16 (as clari-
fied, Aug. 17, 1987); The Effectiveness of the Minitrial in Resolving Complex Commercial Disputes:
A Survey, REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
COMMITrEE ON CORPORATE COUNSEL, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGA-
TION, July 1, 1986 [hereinafter ABA SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT], reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 253.
80. Speaking generically of litigation, an experienced observer pointed out:
[A]n attorney or his client tend to advance an argument or an offer as an abso-
lute fixed quantity that cannot change. The position is important to a party,
representing the merger of all prior principles and emotions in a case. When
the adversary advances a contrary position, the first party sometimes feels
threatened and besieged and defensively advances the same position with more
argument to overcome the opponent by will, strength, and coercion. One be-
comes afraid to make a concession which he thinks will be viewed as a sign of
weakness and generate demands for more concessions. Further aggression en-
sues. The other party also reacts in the same manner. Emotions take over and
each side may lose sight of a realistic objective evaluation of a case. Conse-
quently effective communication stops and each side points its position at the
other sometimes with great hostility. The legal combat continues and
escalates.
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this evidence is anecdotal, observation and common sense suggests
that a closer look at the possibilities of these methods in govern-
ment contract disputes should be taken.
Moreover, some empirical evidence of ADR's effectiveness in
contract cases does exist. As illustrated by the next section of this
study, experience to date shows that these methods have been im-
plemented successfully in contract disputes. While some critics may
claim that, at this point, proof of the benefits of these methods is
less than scientific, these case studies show that ADR is effective for
cutting cost and delay in some instances. 81
The adoption of limited policies or rules, combined with efforts
to enhance awareness, receptivity, and training, hardly have
amounted to a major shift in the way contract claims are handled.
The concerns which have been raised can be met by careful atten-
tion when integrating ADR into the contract system at the point at
which conflicts tend to arise. They can be remedied through en-
lightened administration and oversight. Because ADR clearly should
not be seen as susceptible to producing outcomes that are unreview-
able, unfair, or not in public interest, accountability issues deserve
close attention. This study later examines in greater detail the meth-
ods employed to ensure defensible ADR decisions.8 2 For now, we
begin the consideration of the merits of ADR by expressing confi-
dence that guidelines can be developed for ADR which emphasize
the need for flexibility without compromising the necessary ac-
countability. Even without ADR, agency contracting officials already
routinely negotiate over the award and adjustment of tens of
thousands of contracts, pursuant to guidance on documentation
that generally is viewed as adequate. Settlement negotiations, in the
context of a dispute, generally deal with issues that are the same as,
or analogous to, those issues which typically arise in negotiating or
amending contracts. The mere existence of a formal dispute should
not render suspect a settlement worked out by the parties. This
conclusion is particularly sensible in light of the fact that a sizeable
percentage of contractor claims at the contracting officer and BCA
Martin, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Pre-Argument Conference Program, 40 J. Mo. B. 251,
254, col. 2 (1984).
81. Every agency minitrial except one has avoided years of litigation and a full-
fledged hearing, while producing outcomes that appear to have satisfied nearly every
party who took part. Even in the one Navy case in which a settlement was not produced,
ADR significantly narrowed the issues and reduced the hearing burden. While these
data fall short of absolute, scientific certitude, they do demonstrate the worth of these
methods in at least some contract disputes.
82. See infra pp. 213-15.
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levels already are disposed of consensually. As with other kinds of
negotiations, adequate guidance can, and should be provided on the
degree of documentation appropriate to justify settlements reached
via ADR.
Critics also worry that ADR merely will add more procedures,
tie up busy executives, and bog down BCA judges who should be
concentrating on decisions that will reduce the considerable
backlogs which exist and set precedents to avert disputes in the fu-
ture. Not every case, or even most cases, however, will be appropri-
ate for ADR. Rather, in most cases, ADR will not be a factor.
Second, many agency officials at various levels can serve as principal
negotiators. It would be inaccurate to suggest that only the agency
head or other busy high-ranking officials possess the necessary qual-
ifications. Third, while some disputes will need judicial attention-
especially those which present a new or important question in con-
struing a basic statute or regulation-such cases clearly do not
predominate and by most accounts are not numerous.8 3 To the ex-
tent that these precedent-setting cases do occur, ADR ultimately will
allow a BCA to focus more attention on them by taking a little judi-
cial time early in other, less important cases to avoid lengthy discov-
ery or hearings. The benefits of active judges using ADR and
related case management techniques in federal courts have been
shown.84 Though some doubts as to the notion of the "managerial
judge" have been expressed, 85 the recent, near-continuous rise in
the ratio of filings per BCA judge indicates that in the long run,
BCAs inevitably will need to take added steps to encourage expedi-
tious processes for reaching acceptable decisions.
While there will be occasions when ADR is inappropriate, par-
ties, including agencies, can be expected to act in their enlightened
self-interest to avoid the uncertainty that would interfere with plan-
ning and to refrain from resorting to ADR when it is likely to be
meaningless. Moreover, BCAjudges and other agency officials can
be expected to oversee the use of ADR methods in ways that allow
problems to be raised and remedied as they occur. Thus, for all of
these reasons, many of the concerns expressed seem overdrawn.
83. E.g., letter from David Schwartz, Director, MLS, to MarshallJ. Breger, Chairman,
Administrative Conference (Nov. 16, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
84. E.g., A. ADAMS &J. FIGUEROA, supra note 77; Cappalli, Modelfor Case Management:
The Grants Appeals Board, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND REPORTS 663 (1986); Smythe, supra note 77.
85. E.g., Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Resnik, Managerial Judges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
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The ultimate questions on ADR use primarily do not involve ac-
countability, resources, or efficiency.
Most skeptics even would agree that there are procurement
cases in which ADR can help and should be used. Most even agree
that some training in ADR skills would help BCA judges and other
participants recognize apt cases and settle them. Such modest steps
are worthwhile if only for the prospect of marginal improvements.
Whether ADR methods can succeed fully, as they have in certain
areas; will depend on whether agency officials, those who deal with
them, and congressional and other overseers eventually perceive
consensual decisions which are reached by a person directly respon-
sible as both possible and often preferable to those delegated to
nonaccountable individuals. If so, then there exists no reason why
ADR cannot work as well with government contract disputes as it
has in other contexts.
We now turn to a closer look at the innovative methods that
have been, or might be, employed.
B. Minitrial86
1. General.-Of all the ADR methods discussed, the minitrial
has been both the most often used in major contract claims and the
most written about. The "minitrial" is not really a trial at all.
Rather, it is a structured settlement process in which each side
presents a highly abbreviated summary of its case to senior officials
of each party who are authorized to settle the case.87 Following the
presentations, the officers seek to negotiate a settlement. The mini-
trial combines aspects of several alternative means of dispute reso-
lution to create an informal settlement procedure which retains
many of the features of adversary litigation. Several agencies have
adopted minitrial policies.88 Although the approaches are slightly
different, there are certain common elements. Perhaps most impor-
tant, the parties must reach a pre-minitrial agreement in which the
ground rules for the minitrial are set forth, including the specific
time limits for each stage of the minitrial.89 The parties generally
86. Some portions of this section (e.g., principals, other participants, neutrals, and
rosters) will be pertinent to other devices discussed.
87. Edelman & Carr, supra note 78, at 9, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70,
at 233.
88. These include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), the Department of the Navy, and
the Department of Energy. See ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 701-853.
89. Edelman & Carr, supra note 78, at 12, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note
70, at 236.
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agree to curtail discovery. They also impose a limit of typically one
or two days for the minitrial hearing, followed by a more flexible
limit for the negotiations.
The parties each designate one or occasionally two principals to
represent them at the minitrial. These principals, who usually have
not been involved previously in preparing the case for litigation,
typically are high level officials with full authority to settle the dis-
pute. The parties also have the option of choosing a neutral advisor
to help run the minitrial and advise them on technical or legal is-
sues.90 The neutral should have a legal, and ideally, a technical
background in the area of dispute.
At the minitrial, counsel for each party presents the party's case
to the principals (and perhaps a neutral advisor) in any way counsel
chooses.9 This may include oral argument, examination of wit-
nesses, documentary evidence, films, photos, or other exhibits. The
rules of evidence do not apply. The principals may ask questions of
both attorneys and witnesses. The time limit imposed upon a party
presenting its case is the limit self-imposed in the pre-minitrial
agreement. 92
Once the hearing stage of the minitrial is completed, the princi-
pals and, with consent, the neutral meet privately without the attor-
neys to negotiate. The role of the neutral is dependent completely
on the wishes of the principals. The neutral may mediate the discus-
sions, give legal or technical advice when asked, or even propose
settlement terms. The principals generally have auditors or other
legal and technical advisors available for consultation, but conduct
the negotiations themselves. No transcript is made of the proceed-
ings. If the minitrial does not lead to a settlement, litigation will be
resumed and no reference will be made to the settlement attempts
or to the evidence presented at the minitrial.93
There are many advantages to using a minitrial proceeding to
resolve government contract disputes. 94 Some are worth mention-
ing briefly here. Preparing and completing a minitrial can take as
little as a month as opposed to the two to four years required for
litigation. The saving of personnel time, attorneys' fees, hearings,
discovery burdens, and opportunity costs are obvious. Because the
majority of contract disputes involve questions of fact (or, at a mini-
90. Id. at 11, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 235.
91. Id. at 10, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 234.
92. Id. at 8, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 232.
93. Id. at 13-14, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 237-38.
94. See infra text pp. 208-09.
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mum, mixed questions of law and fact), it is more sensible for high
level management officials to hear summary presentations and ne-
gotiate a settlement using good business judgment than it does for
lawyers to litigate the facts for weeks or months in a hearing. For
those who feel that justice is served more readily in an adversarial
system than in a conciliatory one, the minitrial retains the best of the
adversarial presentations without the time-consuming rules of evi-
dence and procedure. Finally, the minitrial, like arbitration and me-
diation, removes the case from the BCA's docket and permits the
judges to focus on those cases that are unsettleable.
Like any ADR procedure, the minitrial does have its drawbacks
and uncertainties. For example, the pre-minitrial agreement re-
garding time limits must be enforced strictly, especially for discov-
ery, or else the process may still take too long. Also, if only one
party participates in good faith, if the government is not willing to
give its principal full authority to settle, or if another investigation
follows the minitrial, the process may be doomed to failure. Other
issues which complicate the use of the minitrial include the stage of
the litigation at which the minitrial should be introduced, who
should be the government's principal, what role the BCA should
play in overseeing or participating in the minitrial, and what proce-
dures should be used in the minitrial itself.
2. Minitrial Initiatives to Date.-Four agencies-the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of Energy-have experimented successfully
with using minitrials to resolve contract disputes. 5 By 1987, of a
total of eleven cases submitted to minitrial by these four agencies,
nine had been settled and one was ongoing. 6 In addition, the
Corps of Engineers, the Department ofJustice Commercial Branch,
and the Navy have formal minitrial policies, while the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) and the Claims Court have promul-
gated ADR guidance.97 The experiences of these agencies form the
basis of most of this study.
a. NASA. In 1982, NASA conducted the first minitrial ever en-
gaged in by the government. In 1979, Spacecom and TRW filed a
claim to resolve a complex technical dispute concerning whether
95. See ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 701-853.
96. See id. at 229-52, 573-93, 701-852. Unfortunately, more recent statistics are not
available.
97. See id. at 701-853.
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certain requests by NASA were included in a contract or were
changes to it.9" The parties suspended the litigation for three
months shortly after discovery and began to conduct settlement dis-
cussions.9 9 These, however, failed and by 1981, after the parties
had engaged in lengthy discovery, trial was still estimated to be at
least a year away.' 00 At this point Spacecom proposed that they en-
gage in a minitrial to resolve the dispute. The minitrial hearing
lasted only one day, and the parties settled for over one hundred
million dollars on the second day of negotiations.' Although
NASA is a proponent of minitrials, it has not used the minitrial de-
vice since 1982, and currently does not have a formal ADR policy.
b. Army Corps of Engineers. By 1984, the Corps became inter-
ested in experimenting with minitrials and conducted its first mini-
trial in December of that year. The result was the settlement of a
$630,000 claim for $380,000.102 Only six months later, the Corps
conducted a minitrial to settle a forty-three million dollar claim in-
volving a 1979 contract to excavate eleven miles of the Tennessee-
Tombigbee waterway. Even though Corps officials were skeptical
that the minitrial would resolve the dispute, the parties settled for
$17.2 million after a total of 4 days of hearings and 2 days of negoti-
ations spread out over 2 weeks.' 0 3 The claim of Tenn-Tom, the
contractor, was opposed vehemently by district level personnel
within the Corps. More significantly, the settlement was criticized as
being too generous. 1°4 A disgruntled Corps employee, claiming
that the case was too complex to settle in just a few days, accused
the Corps of incompetence.10 5 This prompted an investigation into
the minitrial by the DoD Inspector General. A year after the mini-
98. Johnson, Masri & Oliver, Minitrial Successfully Resolves NASA-TRW Dispute, Legal
Times, Sept. 6, 1982, at 13, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 573.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. For a discussion of this case and issues raised, see Parker & Radoff, The Mini
Hearing: An Alternative to Protracted Litigation of Factually Complex Litigation, 38 Bus. LAw. 35
(1982).
102. Memorandum on Alternative Dispute Resolution Update from Frank Carr and
Sabrina Simon, Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers (Mar. 20, 1987) [hereinaf-
ter Alternative Dispute Resolution Update], reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70,
at 587.
103. Edelman & Carr, supra note 78, at 14, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note
70, at 238.
104. See Navy to Evaluate its ASBCA Cases for Possible Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) 341, 342 (Mar. 2, 1987), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70,
at 589, 590.
105. Drop in MinitrialsAnalyzedat ABA Meeting (excerpt), 46 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 353
(Aug. 25, 1986), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 581.
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trial, the Inspector General released his report. This report en-
dorsed the Tenn-Tom minitrial process and concluded that the
claim was "reasonably settled in the best interest of the Govern-
ment."' 6 It, however, also recommended that the Corps document
its procedures better in the future."0 7
After the Tenn-Tom minitrial, the Corps issued its first formal
circular that provided guidance on the use of minitrials.' 08 Under
these guidelines, Division Engineers' 09 were given the responsibility
to select cases appropriate for minitrial." Further, these guide-
lines required the Chief Trial Attorney to be notified only when a
minitrial had been offered to the contractor."' The individuals in-
volved in the minitrial were to be as follows: the government princi-
pal-the Division Engineer, the contractor's principal-a senior
management official with settlement authority, and the neutral-an
impartial third party with experience in government contracting and
litigation." 2 The circular further outlined the procedures to be fol-
lowed when drafting a minitrial agreement and conducting the hear-
ing and negotiations.
The Corps' South Atlantic Division has employed ADR once.
The North Atlantic Division also conducted a minitrial,"13 and once
conducted a variation of its review board procedure." 24 This most
106. Tenn-Tom Claim Settlement Report, supra note 78, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 70, at 586.
107. Id.
108. See Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Circular on Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Minitrials (Sept. 23, 1985) [hereinafter Circular on ADR], reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 703. For summary of agency policies, see Edelman, ADR
at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 273 (CPR Legal Program 1988) [hereinaf-
ter CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS]; Flaherty, The Mini-Trial Policy of the Department ofJustice, in
CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS, supra, at 325; Turnquist, ADR Initiatives at the Department of the
Navy, in CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS, supra, at 305; Claims Court Approves ADR for Complex
Federal Cases, 5 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION 137 (Sept. 1987).
109. The Corps is a decentralized organization. The headquarters and Chief Counsel
are in Washington, D.C. The Division Engineers, however, who are generals, have al-
most complete authority to do as they wish within their divisions. Each division is di-
vided into districts. Within these districts, it is the District Engineer, usually a colonel,
who is the contracting officer on most contracts.
110. Circular on ADR, supra note 108, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at
704.
111. Id., reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 705.
112. Id.
113. This was the W.G. Construction Corp. case, a dispute in which the Corps settled
a $765,000 claim for $288,000 in February 1987. In this case, however, no neutral was
employed. Alternative Dispute Resolution Update, supra note 102, reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 588.
114. Id. For a detailed discussion of review boards, see infra text pp. 234-35.
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recent minitrial, which involved a $1,768,000 claim by Granite Con-
struction Company, actually was a combination of a minitrial and
nonbinding technical arbitration." 5 The government's and con-
tractor's cases were presented by technical experts, rather than by
lawyers, to a neutral technical expert chosen by the two parties.' 1 6
This neutral expert then prepared a nonbinding written recommen-
dation which he presented orally to the principals three weeks
later."l7 After reading the neutral's report and engaging in a 4 hour
negotiating session, the principals agreed to settle for $725,630, the
amount recommended by the neutral.1"8
The Corps has engaged in two other minitrials. In one mini-
trial, the Middle East/Africa Project Office settled a $105 million
claim for $7 million." 9 In the other minitrial, the Ohio River Divi-
sion resolved a complicated $515,123 claim for $155,000 after a
two-and-a-half day minitrial.120
Almost all those who participated in the Corps of Engineers ex-
periment expressed pleasure with its successes to date, and the
Corps is looking actively for new cases for using minitrials. For ex-
ample, the Ohio River Division has a new policy which requires that
all decisions by the contracting officer within its jurisdiction be con-
sidered for ADR, including minitrials.' 2 '
c. Department of the Navy. Partly because of the successes of
NASA's and the Corps' minitrials and partly because of its concern
with the enormous backlog of cases at the ASBCA, the Navy held
two experimental minitrials during the summer of 1986. The first
experimental minitrial involved two disputes with McDonnell-Doug-
las Corporation concerning a combination of audit and legal is-
sues.' 22 Both disputes were settled through a confidential minitrial
115. Alternative Dispute Resolution Update, supra note 102, reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 588.
116. Id.
117. Memorandum from Stephen Lingenfelter, South Atlantic Division Counsel, to
Lester Edelman, Chief Counsel, Corps of Engineers 104 (May 8, 1987) (discussing alter-
nate dispute resolution in Granite Construction Company,, Eng. BCA No. 4813) (copy
on file with Maryland Law Review).
118. Id.
119. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Update, supra note 102, reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 587.
120. See id., reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 588.
121. Corps of Engineers' Minitrial Considered Success: Program to be Expanded, 43 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) 259 (Feb. 11, 1985).
122. Interview with Anonymous (July 24, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law
Review).
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process. 123 The second minitrial involved an overhead cost alloca-
tion suit. Although it did not settle, it significantly narrowed the
issues. 124
As a result of the relative success of its first two minitrials, the
Navy circulated a one year test policy in December 1986.12 This
stated that it was the Navy's policy to utilize ADR, including minitri-
als and summary binding and nonbinding ASBCA procedures, in
every appropriate case.' 26 There are two main differences between
the Corps' and the Navy's minitrial policies. First, the Navy's Gen-
eral Counsel must approve all uses of ADR before they are con-
ducted.' 27  Second, the Navy strongly prefers that neutrals be
current ASBCA judges.' 28 This test policy was followed in July
1987 by a Navy directive that required contracting officers to offer
contractors, when appropriate, a summary binding ASBCA proce-
dure in cases involving $25,000 or less. In disputes greater than
$25,000, the contracting officer was required to review each case for
minitrial suitability.' 29 Detailed guidelines on minitrials are forth-
coming from the Navy, but the Navy's general policy on minitrial
procedures requires that "[p]rior to the issuance of a Contracting
Officer's Final Decision, the Head of the Contracting Activity ...
shall ensure that all appropriate steps have been taken to resolve the
claim, including the use of ADR techniques."' t3 0
d. Department of Energy. At about the same time that the Corps
and the Navy were implementing ADR, the Department of Energy
held its first minitrial.13 ' This minitrial involved a case in which a
six-week hearing just had been completed. Boecon, a subsidiary of
Boeing which was the subcontractor in this case, filed a claim against
the Department of Energy for damages because of changes and de-
123. Id.
124. Interview with John Turnquist, Chief Litigation Counsel for the Navy (June 19,
1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
125. Memorandum from John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, to General Counsel of
the Navy (Dec. 23, 1986) (discussing the Navy's ADR Program), reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 847.
126. Procedure to be Used in Navy's Test Program Using Alternative Disputes Resolution, 47
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 367, 368 (Mar. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Navy ADR Program], reprinted
in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 848.
127. Id.
128. For a detailed discussion of minitrial neutrals, see infra pp. 215-27.
129. Memorandum from Everett Pyatt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (July 13, 1987)
(copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
130. Navy Memorandum, Implementation of Alternative Disputes Resolution Pro-
gram (Dec. 23, 1986) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
131. See Practice and Perspective, Complex Construction Dispute Settled By First Energy
Board Mini-Trial, 1 ADR REP. 45 (May 14, 1987).
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lay by the government in the construction of a nuclear waste
processing plant substructure.' 32 After a year of discovery, pro-
nounced hostility between the attorneys, and numerous unsuccess-
ful attempts by the Department of Energy BCA to convince them to
settle, the case finally went to trial.' 33
A hearing was held before the BCA, and the Administrative
Judge began to write his opinion. It was at this point that the par-
ties, with much judicial prodding, agreed to a minitrial. The parties
settled for over five million dollars, an amount very close to the
original claim.' 34 The settlement was approved formally by the De-
partment of Energy BCA three months after the minitrial. 135 The
Department of Energy has not conducted any more minitrials, and
does not have a formal policy on ADR.
e. Other Agencies. Increasingly, other offices have become in-
terested in ADR. For example, the Commercial Litigation Branch of
the Department ofJustice circulated a minitrial policy in June 1986,
but has not yet conducted any minitrials.' 36 The EPA issued gui-
dance on the use of ADR (including minitrials) in enforcement
cases.' 37 In addition, the Claims Court implemented voluntary
ADR procedures suggesting or favoring the use of settlement
judges and minitrials. 138
3. Minitrial Results.-Of the eleven cases that have been "mini-
tried" by the government, all but one settled. 139 Generally, the set-
tlements have been somewhere between the two parties' positions.
For example, in the Tenn-Tom case, "[t]he settlement represented
a substantial compromise by both sides from their initial positions in
the litigation."' 40 It is impossible to predict how close the settle-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Id.
136. Memorandum from United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Com-
mercial Litigation Branch, on Alternative Dispute Resolution-Mini-Trials (June 19,
1986), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 827.
137. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance in the Use of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution in EPA Enforcement Cases (1987), reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 737.
138. For texts of these and other relevant agency policy statements, see ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 703-860.
139. The one unsettled case was a Navy minitrial conducted in the summer of 1986.
According to one official, however, the minitrial did serve to significantly focus the is-
sues. See interview with John Turnquist, supra note 124.
140. Ruttinger, Army Corps of Engineers Settles $45 Million Claim at Mini-Trial, ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION 1, 3 (Aug. 1985); see also R. Nash, supra note 45 (the
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ments reached in each case have been to what a board would have
decided. In the Boecon case, however, the settlement figure was
very close to what the judge would have awarded. 14 ' Given the high
settlement rate and acceptability of results (with the exception of the
controversy over the Tenn-Tom case), it is surprising that so few
minitrials have been undertaken.
4. Benefits and Burdens.-For most parties who choose to par-
ticipate in a minitrial, the key consideration is the desire to save time
and money. Naturally, the amounts saved will depend on the stage
in the litigation at which the parties implement the minitrial process.
From beginning to end, minitrials generally take between one and
three months for preparation, hearing, and negotiations, as com-
pared to a BCA process that can take from two to four years.
Perhaps the most important reason for preferring a minitrial to
litigation is that the expedited minitrial procedure ties up key per-
sonnel for a much shorter period of time.' 42 This especially is true
for smaller contractors and agencies who have only a few top man-
agers. When these managers are occupied with litigation for a year
or more, a company inevitably spends less energy on servicing cur-
rent contracts or developing new business, resulting in a decline in
productivity and customer satisfaction. The opportunity cost of liti-
gation often is less immediately apparent to government officers.
The administrative and legal manpower costs in both the private
and the public sectors, however, should be a significant incentive to
shorten the time spent on resolving contract disputes. Also, minitri-
als likely will produce better decisions than formal processes be-
cause the decision-makers are the experts and managers in the field.
Finally, minitrials are particularly advantageous when the parties ex-
pect to have a continuing business relationship. The minitrial al-
lows them to resolve disputes quickly and in an informal manner
which avoids much of the adversarial posturing inherent in
litigation.
Evidence that the minitrial process dramatically cuts down the
total hours spent on resolving the dispute is more commonsensical
and anecdotal than scientific. The parties' attorneys must master
minitrial arrived at "a settlement which pleased neither party but which represented a
fair middle ground").
141. Interview with Judge Carlos Garza (June 24, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland
Law Review). Judge Garza already had held a six-week hearing in the case and was al-
most halfway through writing his opinion when the minitrial was held, and was thus in a
good position to judge the fairness of the settlement.
142. See, e.g., Applying ADR, supra note 5, at 563 (remarks of Jack K. Lemley).
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the details of the dispute in a short time to be able to present co-
gent, complete arguments at a minitrial. While minitrials are be-
lieved to reduce discovery and trial time, "[t]he preparation by the
trial attorney must be even more intense and consuming than for a
board meeting. The trial attorney must know his case totally.' 1 43
For instance, one Corps attorney stated that in preparation for the
minitrial she did approximately two-thirds the amount of work she
would have for a regular hearing.'4 4 She, however, also said that
the process was well worth the time because the dispute was re-
solved quickly and with less disruption of work.145 Clearly, an inten-
sive preparatory effort is required to present and negotiate
effectively. Equally apparent, however, is that these efforts almost
always have succeeded in resolving the case.
5. Minitrial Decision-makers.-Principals.-The principals are
crucial participants in any minitrial or other ADR process. The
principals are representatives of each party to the dispute who hear
competing presentations and then seek to negotiate a settlement.
The principals most often have been relatively high ranking govern-
ment officials and business executives. Although opinion and prac-
tice have varied as to the appropriate rank, experience, and
preparation of the principals, a number of helpful observations can
be made.
How Many Principals?-The number of principals representing
each side has varied and may even be as many as three individu-
als. 146 A clear trend, however, exists toward using a "panel" of only
one principal from each side (possibly assisted by a neutral advisor).
Using a small panel has the advantage of being less burdensome, as
well as simplifying the "hearing" and negotiation segments of the
minitrial. Generally one representative should suffice.' 4 7 There,
however, inevitably will be cases in which the issues are so sprawling
143. Jockisch, "Mini Trial" (1st Impression) (Aug. 13, 1985) (emphasis in original)
(copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
144. Interview with Reba Page, Ohio River Division trial attorney in the Corps' Walter
.T. Dickerson Minitrial (July 31, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
145. Id.
146. ABA SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 24 (i.e., one business representa-
tive and two attorneys), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 253.
147. The exception proving the rule is the one government minitrial to date in which
a larger panel was employed, the NASA-TRW dispute, a very complicated multiparty
case in which, coincidentally, no neutral advisor was used since none could be found
who was adequately informed. Johnson, Masri & Oliver, supra note 98, at 13, reprinted in
ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 573.
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and complex that a lone representative could not properly prepare
and negotiate.
Who Should Serve?-A party must balance several competing fac-
tors when selecting its principal. Principals should have enough re-
sponsibility in their organizations to negotiate, and successfully
defend, a binding settlement. More specifically, they must have in-
herent or delegated authority to bind the organizations they repre-
sent in the dispute at hand. Principals generally should come from a
higher level in the organization than that in which the controversy
arose.' 48 Principals should have little prior involvement with the
case. This will enable the principal to look objectively at the is-
sues.' 49 On the other hand, they will need enough technical exper-
tise to grasp the main issues quickly.
Another competing consideration, especially for government
agencies, is that the principal cannot hail routinely from such a high
level that his or her involvement will detract from the agency's oper-
ations. If minitrials become more important, it will be especially im-
portant to recognize that top management's time is at a premium. 5 0
A few ways in which agencies can meet this concern are by tailoring
the rank of the manager-principal to suit the magnitude of the case,
by encouraging ADR use earlier in the case (e.g., the contracting of-
ficer level), or by occasionally bringing in auditors or others as
principals.
Contractors often have used vice presidents with responsibility
for government contract activities or other senior executives as prin-
cipals. In the Corps of Engineers, the principals have tended to be
division engineers.' These division engineers are generals who
oversee the work of several districts where contracts are adminis-
148. Edelman & Carr, supra note 78, at 9, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70,
at 231.
149. When an agency or contractor is not large, or on major agency projects, there
may be some difficulty finding an "unbiased" principal. This has not precluded success-
ful resort to minitrial, which in any event likely will be a principal's first chance to hear
all the weaknesses of his side's case and thus should be of considerable value. See letter
from Stephen Lingenfelter, Division Counsel, to Lester Edelman, Chief Counsel, Corps
of Engineers (Dec. 13, 1984) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
150. The government principal should be as high ranking as possible. The reason for
this perhaps stems from a desire to increase finality by reducing second-guessing within
the agency; other possible explanations are that a high level officer will be less influ-
enced by operational level biases, less well-informed on technical details, more comfort-
able dealing with large sums, or simply inclined to split the difference and get back to
other duties.
151. Interview with Frank Carr, Corps of Engineers (June 18, 1987) (copy on file with
Maryland Law Review).
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tered day-to-day. In smaller minitrials, contracting officers occa-
sionally have acted as principals. 15 2
Agencies may wish to designate several respected officials (e.g.,
generals or admirals in the armed forces) as a pool of potential prin-
cipals for major minitrials. Further, agencies should take the neces-
sary steps to make participation as a principal an attractive career
step. Agencies should encourage (or even provide) training in ne-
gotiation, mediation, and ADR skills among groups of potential
principals.
Virtually all knowledgeable observers disfavor using attorneys
as principals. Rather, high or mid-level bureaucrats, business repre-
sentatives, or technical experts are preferable. "The involvement of
top management in the mini-trial is essential to the success of the
process. Having top management decide the dispute, rather than
attorneys and judges, enables the parties to utilize management
skills and policies to resolve a dispute that is heavily fact-ori-
ented.' l Lawyers are trained, and often tend to act, more as advo-
cates than as negotiators. Consequently, they may be less likely to
reach decisions based on sound business reasons than on litigation
tactics or formal legal or other principles which are less relevant to
the case at hand. Opponents often are reluctant to risk a minitrial
under such circumstances.
Preparation.-While a few observers believe that unfamiliarity
with the dispute is the best approach, most principals to date have
been well served by being thoroughly informed in advance of the
relevant facts and the parties' positions. This will permit the trial
counsel to concentrate on educating the other principal and the neu-
tral advisor as to the strengths of the case and the weaknesses of the
opponent's. The minitrial preparations of the principal should in-
clude both liability and damages issues, because any settlement nec-
essarily will address these issues. Given the brief time frame, the
principal will not have the time to prepare a damages case once the
hearing has begun.
A good example of thorough preparation is that done by the
government principal William Voigt in the Department of Energy-
Boecon proceeding. Mr. Voigt, a nuclear physicist serving as the
Director of the Department's Office of Remedial Action and Waste
Technology, had only limited previous experience in contract dis-
152. This was the case, for example, in the W.G. Construction, Inc. minitrial. Id.
153. Edelman & Carr, supra note 78, at 9, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70,
at 233.
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putes. 1 5 4 He estimated that he spent seventy-two hours reviewing
briefs and documents, talking to the Department's project manager,
and being briefed by the agency's trial attorneys and General Coun-
sel on the law.' 5 5 His burden, however, was especially great because
the case already had gone through a year of discovery and a six-
week hearing. Most principals to date have spent considerably less
preparation time, and some view this degree of preparation by a
high-level manager as excessive. Even Mr. Voigt believed that he
could have negotiated comfortably with less information.' 5 6 Still,
this degree of preparation has helped produce prompt settlements
of bitterly contested, highly complex disputes without subsequent
recriminations.
Principals' Roles.-During the minitrial process, the principals'
roles typically include presiding over the "hearing," enforcing (and
decide whether to vary) the ground rules, and negotiating together
immediately after the hearing. During the initial stage, the princi-
pals are free to pose questions, either while both sides are present-
ing their cases or in designated question-and-answer sessions.
Principals also determine the role to be played by the neutral advi-
sor. The principals should not only approach the process with an
open minded willingness to assess both sides, but they also must
conduct themselves so as to avoid appearing biased as to the merits.
If not, effective negotiation is inhibited. One way to help ensure
that the principals do not appear overly biased is to encourage the
neutral advisor to ask many of the tough questions at the hearing,
even at the risk of having the neutral appear biased.
Once the principals have assessed the strengths and weaknesses
of both sides' positions, their negotiations should take place
promptly. Any settlement reached by the principals should be final
and binding. Principals should not feel inhibited from seeking ex-
pert advice as needed during their talks or involving other repre-
sentatives in the negotiations. At the same time, the responsible
principals should have, and feel comfortable exercising, authority to
resolve all issues before them without seeking third-party approval
following the close of negotiations."'
154. Interview with William R. Voigt, Department of Energy (June 26, 1987) (copy on
file with Maryland Law Review).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. One exception here may be occasional consultation with in-house counsel in
preparation of a settlement or legal memorandum supporting the result. E.g., Navy ADR
Program, supra note 126, at 368 (the Navy principal must have the right to consult with
nonlitigation in-house counsel prior to a final agreement or resolution of a dispute).
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Successful service as a principal generally requires more than
sound preparation, questioning, and negotiating. Some degree of
courage and bureaucratic skill also will be needed. Principals some-
times will need to find merit in an opponent's contentions long after
subordinates, auditors, or counsel have taken fixed (and possibly
narrow or contentious) positions to the contrary. Some potential
principals inevitably will lack the fortitude or skill to resolve difficul-
ties that arise over a contract. Just as many cases will not be appro-
priate for ADR, there inevitably will be some mistakes made in those
which are minitried.
Contracting officers, project officers, and their superiors (at
headquarters, regional, or division level) must recognize two funda-
mental notions: first, there are worse things than making a mistake
and, second, safe proceduFes and exhaustive documentation will not
necessarily produce better decisions, but often will produce more
procedures and, ultimately, stultification. It remains to be seen
whether bureaucratic behavior, agency evaluations, and congres-
sional oversight of minitrial uses can reflect sensitivity to these fac-
tors. If they do, there is a possibility of creating the leadership
necessary for developing (1) an atmosphere that will make line of-
ficers comfortable with exercising discretion, (2) minitrial or other
ADR procedures designed to yield defensible compromises effi-
ciently, and (3) officers who have the skills and training to use them
energetically.
These developments, however, are a long way off. So far, no
principal has served twice in minitrials. In some agencies, congres-
sional objections or other controversies over particular settlements
have inhibited the use of ADR. For instance, notwithstanding the
exceptional leadership displayed in the Corps' ADR effort, the rela-
tively small number of minitrials so far may stem from a reluctance
of some division officers to risk recriminations at the district level or
investigations by the inspector general. Without bureaucrats and
officers who are willing and able to exercise the negotiation and
management skills necessary to be a principal, the area of govern-
ment contracts never will realize the value inherent in minitrials and
other kinds of ADR.
6. Other Participants.-Principals generally have access to advi-
sors, including (in appropriate cases) legal counsel, technical ex-
perts, and auditors. Frequently, these persons take part as witnesses
or observers in minitrials. In other cases, the principal only consults
with them in preparation and acts alone at the minitrial itself. These
persons certainly should be available to those principals who desire
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such assistance during the hearing and negotiations.' 58 This serves
to produce a more well-informed, defensible resolution. It also
helps to enhance accountability and to build intra-organizational
support for the settlement. Achieving these goals is important be-
cause by the time a dispute reaches the BCA stage, major segments
of the agency will have fought a contractor's claims and likely will be
displeased at the prospect of a settlement that is negotiated in a day
or so.
At times during the negotiation phase, the principals will have
the benefit of caucuses with others from their organizations to dis-
cuss the progress of the negotiations and the staffs concerns. When
the government principals think it is important for the contractor to
provide a more detailed explanation of claimed costs, they also will
bring auditors or other staff members into the negotiations.
On occasion, access to the hearing will be tightly restricted, and
witnesses sequestered. For example, in the Navy-McDonnell Doug-
las minitrial, in addition to sequestering the witnesses, auditors were
not allowed to be present at the minitrial, even though the case
raised cost allocation issues.1 5 9 Unless secrecy is especially impor-
tant, it ordinarily will be unwise to sequester most minitrial wit-
nesses. This is particularly true of experts, since a looser format
may encourage dialogues or exchanges that can help focus issues
and even promote agreement.
Legal Advisors. In many instances, the principal may desire to
have a legal advisor. An attorney interviewed for this study, how-
ever, suggested that if the principal is to have a legal advisor during
the course of the proceeding, this person ordinarily should not be
the trial counsel who prepares and presents the case at the mini-
trial.' 6 ' Such a dual role poses the danger that the trial counsel
might be too adversarial to provide dispassionate advice during the
settlement talks. The counter argument, of course, is that qualified
lawyers would know best how to serve their clients, whether in an
adversarial or an advisory context, or both.
158. The Corps apparently makes a practice of including auditors at minitrials. See
interview with Frank Carr, supra note 151.
159. Interview with Ralph Nash, Jr., Professor, George Washington University (July
28, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review). This decision and the settlement it-
produced have been criticized by some agency officials as intended simply to "allow the
parties to continue their business relationship" without confronting all issues. These
critics, however, have not questioned the substantive settlement, only the closed process
by which it was reached. Interview with Anonymous, supra note 122.
160. Letter from Wesley C. Jockisch to Lester Edelman, Chief Counsel, Corps of En-
gineers (Aug. 13, 1985) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
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Auditors. Volumes could be written on the benefits and draw-
backs of the growing reliance upon auditors and inspectors.' 6 '
These personnel presumably will have a role in many cases which
feature major issues of accounting principles or their application.
Auditors are valuable resources and should not be ignored. They
can address cost issues (incurred and allowable) and help principals
decide these issues so that the principal understands what a good
settlement figure is. Auditors, who participate in minitrials as part
of a management problem solving team, can be quite effective in
furthering defensible settlements in the government interest. The
auditor must realize that accounting, like management, often is as
much an art as a science. As with lawyers, principals, and oversight
personnel, what is to be avoided is inflexible auditor participation.
Also to be avoided is an auditor who refuses to balance competing
views or fails to give heed to the fact that management realities
sometimes must influence decisions as much as the ability to place
everything into "neat" categories.
7. Neutral Advisors.-Is a Neutral Necessary? Unlike the princi-
pals, the "neutral advisor" who helps the parties assess the merits of
a case is not always necessary. While a majority of attorneys sur-
veyed in one study thought that the advisor was helpful in resolving
their disputes,16 2 several government minitrials have yielded settle-
ments without any third-party intervention. 163 In fact, the Depart-
ment of the Navy's policy recommends the use of an advisor in
smaller cases only in exceptional cases. 16 4 It is difficult to categorize
cases in which a neutral is less likely to be helpful. Some examples
include cases in which the principals already have a good working
relationship, when issues are simple or amounts small, or, con-
versely, when complex technical issues predominate to such an ex-
tent that it would be futile to waste time trying to educate a neutral.
161. In the Department of Defense, contracting officers who depart substantially from
auditors' recommendations must justify their actions in writing. Bednar & Jones, supra
note 44, at 49. The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General now super-
vises over 20,000 persons, including Defense Contract Audit Agency auditors and more
criminal investigators than the entire FBI.
162. ABA SUBCoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 20, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 70, at 274.
163. In 1982, NASA resolved a $100,000 dispute with TRW without the use of a neu-
tral. Appeals Board Judges' Conference Explores ADR Applicability, 1 Alt. Dis. Res. Rep. (BNA)
32, 33 (May 14, 1987). In addition, the Corps settled a $764,783 claim for $288,000
without a neutral. Id. at 33-34.
164. Navy ADR Program, supra note 126, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at
849.
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Neutrals may be needed when the minitrial occurs soon after the
dispute arises, i.e., at the contracting officer level. At this point, posi-
tions may be less rigid, formal procedures not yet invoked, and
fewer parts of the agency implicated. In those cases, the contracting
officer might well serve as a sort of presider-principal.
Roles of the Neutral. In the cases in which neutrals have been
used, their role has varied greatly. The role of the neutral naturally
will depend on the dispute and the parties' wishes, the neutral's
background, skills, and predilections, and developments during the
minitrial process. Indeed, one of the strengths of the minitrial is the
flexibility available to the parties to shape the neutral's role to the
case at hand. In most cases, this role has been very different from,
though not necessarily incompatible with, that of a judge.' 65 For
example, the neutral makes no binding decisions on the merits, and
usually does not become involved in the management of the case or
attempt to control or regulate the manner or substance of the
presentations. Rather, he or she serves as a facilitator and an advi-
sor who poses questions. In addition, when asked by the principal
representatives, the neutral may provide insight and observations
on various points and issues. 16 6
The neutral's role should be defined (at least tentatively) prior
to the hearing. The principals should give input as to what role the
neutral will fill. Any shift during the proceeding should be only with
the concurrence of the principals.
In the Corps' Tennessee-Tombigbee case, as in some others,
the role of the neutral advisor turned out to be larger than antici-
pated. 167 The principals (both high-ranking managers) and the neu-
tral met for dinner the night before the minitrial. They decided
that, notwithstanding a fairly restrictive minitrial agreement, the en-
tire proceeding should be approached with a degree of flexibility. 168
During the hearing, the neutral and the principals asked questions
to assure that the facts were ascertained. At one point, the neutral
advisor suggested that key expert witnesses of each side be called
165. Appeals Board Judges' Conference Explores ADR Applicability, supra note 163, at 33 (re-
marks of Ralph Nash, Jr.).
166. See letter from Stephen Lingenfelter to Lester Edelman, supra note 149.
167. Mini-Trial Agreement on Contract No. DACW62-79-C-0102, Apr. 15, 1985,
United States Corps of Engineers-Tenn-Tom Constructors (construction contract for
the Divide Cut of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway) (copy on file with Maryland Law
Review). The minitrial agreement provided that the advisor "will be responsible for en-
forcing the time limitations set forth in paragraph 13 hereof, but otherwise will not be
actively involved in the conduct of the mini-trial proceedings." Id. at 4.
168. R. Nash, supra note 45.
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and questioned simultaneously. The neutral then guided the ex-
perts "through a conversation where they were able to directly con-
front each other in discussing the most significant areas of factual
disagreement."169
The neutral also helped the parties prepare for, and identify
relevant issues in a supplemental hearing on quantum (damages).
During the negotiation the neutral advisor worked actively to aid
settlement. He advised each side on the strengths and weaknesses
of its case, the relevant legal principals, and how the law applied to
the facts established. The neutral also served "as a type of mediator
suggesting middle grounds that might lead to settlement and pro-
posing various methods of computing the amount of the price ad-
justment to which the contractor might be entitled."' 7 6
This model, obviously a relatively activist one, includes inquisi-
torial, advice-giving, and mediating components. Attorneys in many
minitrials have expressed the view that the advisor is most useful
when he is similarly actively involved.' 7 ' Without controlling the
proceedings or making judicial-style rulings, the advisor can be
helpful questioning witnesses in a probing yet nonadversarial fash-
ion, responding freely to principals' requests for advice,' 72 and gen-
tly pointing out the proper weight to be given certain testimony.'
73
The advisor may even provide a written, nonbinding opinion to aid
the principals. At the other extreme, the neutral may do little more
in furthering a settlement than respond to technical or legal ques-
169. Id.
170. Id. In the Corps and Industrial Contractors, Inc. minitrial, the neutral, when
requested, told the principals that the contractor had a slightly better case than the gov-
ernment, but that its costs were inflated and there was substantial room for negotiation.
Letter from Stephen Lingenfelter to Lester Edelman, supra note 149, at 4. In the De-
partment of Energy and Boecon Company minitrial, the neutral similarly advised the
parties, though the neutral never advised a party to accept a particular offer. Complex.
Construction Dispute Settled By First Energy Board Mini-Trial, 1 Alt. Dis. Res. Rep. (BNA) 45,
46 (May 14, 1987).
171. See ABA SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 20, reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 274.
172. One neutral recognized a need for the advisor to "reassure [the principals] as to
the impact of federal contract law in the case." Appeals Board Judges' Conference Explores
ADR Applicability, supra note 163, at 33.
173. This might happen if evidence clearly is hearsay or another reason for concern
exists. In the Corps of Engineers and Industrial Contractors, Inc. minitrial, for example,
the neutral pointed out that, while the views of a consulting C.P.A. who testified on
planned and total costs would be of interest, he also would want to hear from an engi-
neer who could address the reasonableness of the planned cost and reasons for in-
creases. According to the neutral, an auditor generally provides an analysis of
information given to him without questioning why or how costs were incurred. Letter
from Stephen Lingenfelter to Lester Edelman, supra note 149, at 2-3.
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tions from the principals. If the principals are concerned that mem-
bers of their staffs need to be persuaded, the neutral can help by
suggesting that they be brought into the negotiations. Another
technique to pacify skeptical staff members is briefing or working
with the principals and attorneys to prepare a settlement memoran-
dum or other justification for the compromise reached. Unless prin-
cipals specifically direct otherwise, a neutral who feels comfortable
acting in a mediative role should not hesitate to do so.
Requisite Skills. Many who have participated in minitrials main-
tain that neutral advisors need no legal training, and that any person
acceptable to the parties can be used, since many cases turn on engi-
neering, accounting, or other technical or nonlegal questions. 174
Some suggested that mediation training is useful, allowing the neu-
tral to respond perceptively to the principals' wishes and also help
further negotiations if asked.' 75 However, no neutral in a govern-
ment minitrial has been a professional mediator.' 76 Others main-
tain legal expertise to be a sine qua non. 1 77 They note that the
principals and their staffs likely will have the background to weigh
technical issues, but frequently would benefit from independent
legal advice on what often are arcane matters. This will let them
assess risks better, reach a decision, and "sell" or defend a settle-
ment within their organizations. 78 Both the Navy and the Corps
require the neutral to have government contracting and litigation
experience. 179
Sources. Theoretically, major sources of ADR neutrals include
(1) former judges, (2) BCA members and other active judges, (3)
academics, (4) current government employees, (5) retired govern-
ment employees, (6) private practitioners, and (7) mediators or their
ADR experts. Virtually all neutrals in the relatively few cases to date
have been ex-judges or law professors with an expertise in govern-
ment contracting. Each of these potential pools has its advantages
174. See ABA SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 21, reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 275.
175. See interview with Judge Richard C. Solibakke, Corps of Engineers BCA (Feb. 12,
1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
176. Appeals Board Judges' Conference Explores ADR Applicability, supra note 163, at 33.
177. See Edelman & Carr, supra note 78, at 11, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 235.
178. Remarks of Professor Ralph C. Nash, Jr., BCA Judges Association Seminar (Apr.
11, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
179. Army Corps of Engineers Minitrial Policy (Sept. 23, 1985) (issued in Engineer
Circular 27-1-3), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 703; Navy ADR Program,
supra note 126, at 368, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 849.
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and disadvantages, many obvious and others fairly subtle.'
Private Practitioners and Retired Judges.' 8' There are a number of
potential problems in finding, hiring, and contracting with private
neutrals. The lengthy nature of the standard procurement process
often is inconsistent with the goals of ADR and negotiated rulemak-
ing, in which speed and efficiency often are critical. The competi-
tion required in all but small procurements may be inconsistent with
an agency's particular needs. Emphasizing price as a consideration
in evaluating proposals may not be the most effective means of se-
lecting the best neutral for the job. While most agency payments to
neutrals (save in a few large cases) will fall below the thresholds for
full competition and notification, this fact does not render negligible
the importance of competition and an open process.
Other problems of dealing with private neutrals, and some pub-
licly employed ones, relate to qualifications and neutrality. Hard-
and-fast rules are not easy to come by, but the Administrative Con-
ference has suggested a few guidelines:
While skill or experience in the process of resolving dis-
putes, such as that possessed by mediators and arbitrators,
is usually an important criterion in the selection of neu-
trals, and knowledge of the applicable statutory and regula-
tory schemes may at times be important, other specific
qualifications would be required only when necessary for
resolution of the dispute. For example:
(a) Agencies should not necessarily disqualify persons
who have mediation, arbitration or judicial experience but
no specific experience in the particular ADR process being
pursued.
(b) While agencies should be careful not to select neu-
trals who have a personal or financial interest in the out-
come, insisting upon "absolute neutrality"-e.g., no prior
affiliation with either the agency or the private industry in-
volved-may unduly restrict the pool of available neutrals,
180. See generally Appeals Board Judges' Conference Explores ADR Applicability, supra note
163, at 32-33.
181. George Ruttinger, in his 1986 study for the Administrative Conference, thought-
fully explored several major issues involved in using some of these groups, including
neutrality standards, relevant expertise, and finding and hiring private neutrals. Rut-
tinger, Acquiring the Services of Neutralsfor Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, in ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 891
(1986), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 885. Ruttinger's conclusions are
embodied in Administrative Conference Recommendation 86-8. 1 C.F.R § 305.86-8
(1989).
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particularly where the neutral neither renders a decision
nor gives formal advice as to the outcome.
(c) Agencies should insist upon technical expertise in
the substantive issues underlying the dispute or negotiated
rulemaking only when the technical issues are so complex
that the neutral could not effectively understand and com-
municate the parties' positions without it.1
82
A few agencies have taken a position against using as a neutral
any private lawyer who has represented contractors against the gov-
ernment or who has any past or present affiliation with any party to
the dispute. These policies seem somewhat too restrictive. They,
however, may be justified as necessary to insulate the first few tenta-
tive minitrials from one possible source of criticism. Realistically,
though, the persons most knowledgeable about contracting disputes
almost certainly will have been affiliated with the government, pri-
vate contractors or both. In the long run, unless retired and sitting
judges are used exclusively, restrictive agency policies probably will
mellow. So long as private neutrals have no personal or financial
stake, they should be eligible to serve.
Academics. A surprisingly high number of advisors have been
law professors who are experts in the field of government contracts.
Under some agency minitrial policies, certain law professors are re-
garded as preferred minitrial neutrals 8 3 because of their expertise
and perceived neutrality. In addition, unlike BCA judges, they can
be employed without concern that other cases will suffer neglect.
On the other hand, unless these neutrals provide their services pro
bono, the parties will have to pay these advisors under an acquisi-
tion contract. Another concern is that academics may have strong
views on some legal, accounting, or technical questions and thus un-
duly influence the outcome. In any case, professors with this back-
ground are few in number. 184 Barring a rapid rise in academic
interest in the area, this resource pool will remain shallow quantita-
tively if not qualitatively.
BCA Members and Other Active Judges. Most observers in the con-
tract field view these officers as potentially excellent neutrals. For
example, under the recent Navy and Claims Court ADR policies, ac-
tive BCA members and judges comprise the preferred sources for
182. 1 C.F.R 305.86-8 (1989).
183. See Army Corps of Engineers Minitrial Policy, supra note 179, at 3, reprinted in
ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 705.
184. As of 1987, all such government minitrial neutrals taught at the George Wash-
ington University School of Law, which has a unique government contracts program.
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minitrial neutrals.'" 5 Some obvious advantages associated with us-
ing these individuals as neutrals include their expertise in govern-
ment contracting matters, 186 the authoritative nature of their advice,
the fact that they are already on the government payroll, and their
relative neutrality.' 87 The BCAs are currently the tribunals of last
resort for the great bulk of government contract disputes that reach
litigation. They have gained the credibility and the authority that
may be employed readily to help parties resolve many of their dis-
putes earlier in the process and with less formality than a full
hearing.
Other advantages also may accrue. Because administrative
judges are familiar with issues or cases (or classes of cases) com-
monly before their boards, they presumably should take less time
than outsiders to get acquainted with the facts and issues of a mini-
trial. A presiding BCA judge also may be more willing to enter a
settlement negotiated with the involvement of another judge as a
board order than a settlement negotiated by a private neutral. This
may influence the government's willingness to settle, since in some
cases a formal order, unlike an agreement between the parties, may
be paid from the general judgment fund rather than scarce agency
program funds.'8 8 Similarly, Congress may prove more receptive to
appropriating additional funds to cover large settlements which are
185. United States Claims Court General Order No. 13 (Apr. 15, 1987), reprinted in
ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 731; Navy ADR Program, supra note 126, at 368,
reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 849.
186. BCAjudges are required to have five years experience in public contract law. 41
U.S.C. § 607(b)(1) (1982).
187. Administrative Judges at BCAs, according to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978
(CDA), are to be selected in the same manner as Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), id.
§ 607(b)(1), and are insulated by ex parte restrictions and other guarantees of indepen-
dence. Daniel Joseph and Michelle Gilbert's Draft Report to the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States regarding agency use of settlement judges indicates that the
settlement judge can command substantial deference and speaks with authority that de-
rives both from his general familiarity with an agency's case load and his position as a
judge. Joseph & Gilbert, Breaking the Settlement Ice: The Use of Settlement Judges in Administra-
tive Proceedings, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS 281, 297 (1988). "If that official decisionmaking system meets [the
parties] halfway with an official, authoritative, but still non-binding and non-prejudging
review of the questions of whether settlement is appropriate, they may feel that their
perceived need to invoke adjudication has been responded to." Id. at 297-98.
188. The CDA technically requires agencies to reimburse the judgment fund either
out of current funds or through deficiency appropriations from Congress. 41 U.S.C.
§ 612(c) (1982). Sometimes, however, agencies cannot reimburse the fund because they
do not have enough money themselves and are unable to get additional appropriations,
either because the Office of Management and Budget prevents them from asking Con-
gress or Congress refuses the request. While the General Accounting Office (GAO)
seeks to ensure subsequent reimbursement, and maintains that it usually does so, con-
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approved by a BCA member. Finally, congressional committees or
inspector generals may be somewhat less likely to closely scrutinize
such agreements. 189
Experts in federal personnel and contracting, including repre-
sentatives of the General Accounting Office (GAO), agree that there
are no legal obstacles to BCA members acting as neutrals in cases
pending before their own or other Boards.' 9 ° The only restriction
under the CDA is that BCA members shall have no other inconsis-
tent duties.' As long as the agency knows that its BCA members
are serving as neutrals and has determined that there is no conflict
with their regular duties, there will be no legal impediments to using
BCA judges as neutrals.
On the other hand, the Army Corps of Engineers prefers not to
use BCA judges, and has employed private neutrals.' 92 Several
knowledgeable observers have advanced vigorous arguments
against using BCA judges as neutrals. Their concerns are:
(1) Government personnel's time and services are hardly
tracting officials' perceptions that payments will not affect current appropriations are
real and have an effect.
189. An example of the danger settlements can run into is Blackhawk Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. United States, 622 F.2d 539 (Ct. Cl. 1980). The Veterans Administra-
tion (VA) reached a $10.3 million settlement with Blackhawk for a dispute arising out of
the construction of additions to a VA hospital. Id. at 541. Before the money could be
paid, however, a number of senators and congressman questioned the settlement and
urged the Administrator of the VA not to pay it. The Administrator nevertheless de-
cided to honor the settlement. Id. at 544. As a result, an amendment was added to the
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1974 which required the VA to obtain specific ap-
propriation from Congress to settle any construction contract dispute for over
$1,000,000. Id. The conferees also provided that the VA could pay only up to
$6,000,000 of any pending settlement agreement. Id. at 544-45. The conference report
further stated that
it is the sense of the conferees that all claims against the Veterans Administra-
tion should be processed through the agency Board of Contract Appeals unless
there is adequate legal analysis, audit information, and claim documentation to
show that settlement outside the board of contract appeals is in the best inter-
ests of the government.
Id. at 545.
The VA paid $6 million of the settlement before the Appropriations Act was enacted
into law, but thereafter could not legally pay the remaining amount. Id. at 545-46.
Blackhawk then initiated suit for payment. The court held that the contract was subject
to acts of Congress, and that Blackhawk was not entitled to the rest of the settlement,
though it could still pursue further relief in an appropriate forum in connection with the
contract claims underlying the settlement. Id. at 552-54.
190. Interview with Dick Berg, MLS, Marvin Morse, Department ofJustice, and Rollee
Efros, General Accounting Office (Aug. 6, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
191. 41 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1) (1982).
192. Interview with Frank Carr, supra note 151; interview with Judge Richard C.
Solibakke, supra note 175.
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"free," and the effective costs may equal or exceed those of private
neutrals.
(2) BCA judges, at least at several boards, have large backlogs
and can spend their time better by writing decisions rather than
working to resolve cases that may ultimately settle without judicial
intervention.19
3
(3) Many BCAjudges are experts, not at mediation or minitrial
or even settlement promotion, but rather at holding formal hearings
and applying contracting or accounting rules to factual situations in
written decisions.
(4) Even if the BCA member acting as a neutral advisor is re-
cused after an inconclusive minitrial, the close quarters and small
size of most boards can render confidentiality difficult to maintain.
A judge may have a difficult time avoiding hearing discussions of a
case.
(5) Many boards have only three members, and, since panels
are comprised of three judges will have trouble finding a minitrial
settlement judge who could then be recused if settlement efforts
fail.
These interviewees maintained that active judges are accus-
tomed to presiding over formal proceedings and issuing rulings to
control the parties. Other individuals with relations to the parties
that are more flexible and less hierarchical may be more likely to
tailor their actions to the instant case. In addition, they fear that
control of the process, intended to be shaped and guided by the
parties, will be lost to the judges.
Some judges obviously are more successful at promoting settle-
ments than others, usually those who are less activist. Similarly,
minitrial "styles" will vary. Even so, it is worth considering whether
BCA judges, as a class of individuals who preside regularly over a
relatively compact group of agency personnel and public contrac-
tors lawyers, may be less inclined to intervene actively to offer frank
opinions and explore alternatives. They also may be received less
comfortably than someone who is unlikely to preside over the par-
ties ever again. Onejudge stated that, if called on to serve as a neu-
tral in a case already before him, he would be uncomfortable getting
involved in quantum discussions, would be less likely to get involved
in furthering a rapport with the principals, as have some neutrals,
193. The majority of cases at the ASBCA, for example, have been resolved without
hearings in recent years. Final Minutes of Administrative Conference Committee on
Administration Meeting (May 2, 1986) (comments ofJudge Ruth Burg).
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and would be leery of ex parte contacts and of talking to the princi-
pals without counsel present, as many mediators and other neutrals
do regularly.' 9 4 The same judge suggested that he would feel only
somewhat less constrained if he were not going to be on the panel
ultimately hearing the case, and would feel most free to take an ac-
tive role if he were serving as a neutral for another agency's
board. 195
The weight of the objections recited to using board members as
neutrals is certain to vary depending on the judge, the board, the
case in question, and available alternative neutrals. Several objec-
tions, however, can be overcome and agencies clearly have the au-
thority to use BCAjudges as neutral advisors. These expert officials
should not be excluded routinely. The dispute resolution experi-
ence gained in mediation or minitrials may be carried over to the
remainder of a judge's cases.' 9 6 Several board chairmen responded
enthusiastically to experimenting with ADR, and, specifically to hav-
ing interested board members trained to act as minitrial neutrals.
Careful thought should be given to how best to employ the board
members more actively to resolve cases without hearing.
Selection and Payment. The parties sometimes identify the neutral
in the minitrial agreement. More commonly, however, the minitrial
agreement includes a provision setting forth the selection proce-
dure. The most common process is submission by the parties of
ranked lists of acceptable neutrals. 197 Under the Navy process the
194. Interview with Judge Carroll C. Dicus, Jr., NASA BCA (July 15, 1987) (copy on
file with Maryland Law Review). These averments are not included to demonstrate that
judges should not be used as neutrals. Rather, they suggest that it may be unwise to
limit the parties to judges from a particular board or even to BCA judges as a group.
195. Id.
196. This has proven true, for instance, at the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB), where some presiding officers participating in an expedited appeal experiment
upped their overall settlement rate dramatically. Letter from Paul Mahoney, MSPB, to
Charles Pou (Mar. 11, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
197. E.g., Guidance on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in EPA Enforcement
Cases (EPA memorandum) [hereinafter EPA ADR Guidance], reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 738. These guidelines suggest the following selection
method:
After the filing of the joint request for arbitration, the NAA [National Arbi-
tration Association] shall submit simultaneously to all parties to the dispute an
identical list of ten [five] names of persons chosen from the National Panel of
Environmental Arbitrators. Each party to the dispute shall have seven days
from the date of receipt to strike any names objected to, number the remaining
names to indicate order of preference, and return the list to the NAA. Ifa party
does not return the list within the time specified, all persons named shall be
deemed acceptable. From among the persons who have been approved on all
lists, and if possible, in accordance with the designated order of mutual prefer-
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parties must agree on a list of mutually acceptable ASBCAjudges to
be submitted to the Board's Chairman.' 98 At the Claims Court, an
ADR judge is assigned by the Clerk of the Court on application by
the parties with the presiding judge's concurrence.' 99
Occasionally an effort is made to ascertain, and maintain, an
advisor's neutrality at this stage. For example, either party may be
forbidden to approach the advisor unilaterally on any issue concern-
ing the merits of the dispute or the parties may even be required to
ascertain and disclose all prior contacts with a person nominated to
serve as advisor.200 Such formality often may be unnecessary or
counterproductive, but may help guarantee acceptability and
fairness.
A few private neutrals have served without charge, while others
have contracted to serve for fixed fees with the costs split by the
parties. 20 1 An alternative used occasionally provides that if the advi-
sor gives an opinion on how the case should be resolved, a party
who fails to follow the recommended disposition shall bear the advi-
sor's fees and expenses.20 2
Roster of Neutrals. There are a number of challenges which must
be met to foster the expansion of ADR and the use of neutrals.
Agencies should attempt to develop and refine procurement proce-
dures that will simplify the process of hiring outside neutrals. The
government also should strive to expand the base of private or pub-
lic individuals from which to select the neutrals. Information on
neutrals should be pooled into a centralized place from which ros-
ence, the NAA shall invite an Arbitrator to serve. If the parties fail to agree
upon any of the persons named, or if acceptable Arbitrators are unable to
serve, or if for any other reason the appointment cannot be made from the
submitted lists, the NAA shall make the appointment from among other mem-
bers of the Panel without the submission of any additional lists. Once the NAA
makes the appointment, it shall immediately notify the parties of the identity of
the Arbitrator and the date of the appointment.
EPA ADR Guidance Attachment C, supra, at 3-4, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 776-77.
198. Navy ADR Program, supra note 126, at 368, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 849.
199. United States Claims Court General Order No. 13 (Apr. 15, 1987), reprinted in
ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 732.
200. See Minitrial Agreement between Trunkline LNG Co. and FMC Corp. (Oct. 4,
1985) (copy on file with the Maryland Law Review).
201. For a discussion of contracting issues in government agency acquisition of neu-
trals' services, see Ruttinger, supra note 181, at 863, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 885.
202. See EPA ADR Guidance Attachment E, supra note 197, reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 792.
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ters may be formulated. Agencies should be flexible in defining the
qualifications required of outside neutrals. Agencies also should
avoid rigid technical and other expertise requirements. Agencies,
Congress, and others employing ADR should further the following
goals:
-increase the supply of ADR services available to the federal
government;
-insure qualifications of neutrals;
-improve acquisition methods for hiring neutrals; and
-- clarify neutrals' roles and authority.
There is great potential benefit in developing a central roster of
ADR experts and, in particular, minitrial neutrals for contract
cases. 03 Rosters can save time and energy for parties seeking an
advisor. They can help small boards find settlement or minitrial
judges and serve to encourage creation of a cadre of reliable, expert
neutrals to help resolve contract disputes consensually.
Given that a government-wide roster would be worth the effort,
a number of questions arise: Who should be eligible for listing;
should standards of experience, education, or third-party recom-
mendations be set; if so, what criteria should apply; should those
applicants who do not conform to the standards be rejected; and
should the roster be limited to a small, elite group?20 4 Alternatively,
should the roster be based on a disclosure principle? Under this
theory, most or all applicants who provide certain data will be listed,
and the parties will need to decide on a particular neutral. Would
this stimulate a "cottage industry" of advisors? Should any particu-
lar groups, such as government personnel or private attorneys, be
wholly excluded on grounds that one side or the other likely would
strike them for possible bias or conflict of interest? How should
complaints against allegedly incompetent or unfair advisors be han-
dled? Should there be separate rosters for different kinds of cases
or skills?
All of these questions will not be addressed exhaustively in this
study, but several points are worth mentioning. First, the list proba-
203. Administrative Conference Recommendation 86-8 called for the compilation of
such rosters. I C.F.R. § 305.86-8 (1989).
204. This is the situation in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' new
mediation program and the Center for Public Resources' list of "distinguished persons"
available to help resolve certain disputes. This list is comprised of persons such as for-
merjudges, government officials, and executives. The theory behind this is that limiting
the roster will enhance the credibility of the nascent minitrial process and tend to cause
those on the list to view their role as a public service.
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bly should include all who have experience as minitrial advisors.
Second, it should include all administrative judges who wish to serve
as neutral advisors for disputes within their own agency, another
agency, or both. 2°5 Third, the list should include all retired Claims
Court, BCA, and federal judges who are interested. Fourth, in any
case before a contracting officer of a BCA, the parties should have
the option of selecting any mutually agreeable neutral who is avail-
able and has no clear conflict of interest, regardless of where the
neutral comes from. Fifth, no standard fee scale should be estab-
lished. Contrarily, neutrals should be encouraged to serve pro bono
in some cases or at reduced rates. Agencies that expect to have
their judges loaned out should consider developing standards for
reimbursement by user agencies.
Several groups might be able to compile this roster and keep it
updated. These groups include the Administrative Conference, the
OFPP, and the Board of Contract Appeals Judge Association (BO-
CAJA). Resources permitting, the best-placed of these groups to
administer such a roster is the Administrative Conference, working
with the consultation of the groups mentioned and others knowl-
edgeable about contract claims. The Administrative Conference's
membership recently has approved a recommendation calling on its
chairman to work with other agencies to establish rosters of neutrals
from which agencies can draw.2 °6 Similarly, the recommendation
suggests that the chairman should encourage imaginative efforts to
share federal neutrals and remove obstacles. 2°7 The Administrative
Conference's stated willingness to serve, combined with its relative
objectivity and familiarity with the administrative process, makes it a
natural candidate for this job.
C. Mediation
1. Where Has it Been Used?-Mediation, a second category of
ADR, may be useful in government contract cases. In mediation,
the parties try to reach a settlement by negotiating directly with each
other with the help of a neutral mediator who often is specially
205. An informal arrangement now in place between the NASA, Department of En-
ergy, and HUD Boards provides for exchanges of administrative judges when recusal of
a settlement judge or retirement reduces the available panel to fewer than three. Inter-
view with Judge Carroll C. Dicus, supra note 194. No legal obstacles appear to inhibit
interagency sharing. Indeed, agencies for years have shared ALJs from time to time, with
or without reimbursing the lender agency. Interview with Dick Berg, Marvin Morse, and
Rollee Efros, supra note 190.
206. 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-8 (1989).
207. Id.
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trained in dispute resolution. Several courts and agencies have in-
stituted mediation programs, producing dramatic results for some.
In addition to many district courts, several federal courts of appeal
have introduced mandatory mediation for some cases. 208 The Sec-
ond, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have had such a
program for a number of years.2 0 9 In May 1987, the Court- of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit commenced an experi-
mental civil mediation program which requires attendance at an
initial mediation session. At these sessions, distinguished senior
members of the bar serve as mediators, and parties must be repre-
sented by someone with authority to enter into a settlement agree-
ment during the session. Pro Se cases are excluded, as are those
involving multiple parties or interveners.21 °
2. What Is it?-There are two ways in which mediation typi-
cally is initiated. Either the parties voluntarily submit the matter to
a public or private dispute resolution organization, or a court may
suggest or order the parties to submit to mediation. Mediators gen-
erally are process-oriented. Their responsibilities include arranging
meetings between the parties, assisting in the exchange of informa-
tion, and relaying the parties' interests and positions. In fulfilling
this role, mediators may conduct private meetings with the parties
to facilitate the negotiations, and may participate actively by propos-
ing settlements. In many cases, mediators do not need any special
expertise in the areas of dispute. However, it often is helpful in con-
tract cases if they do.
3. Advantages and Disadvantages in the Government Contract Set-
ting.-One advantage of mediation is that it is often a fairly quick
and inexpensive procedure. An additional attractive feature is that
negotiations can be made confidential, or at least treated as settle-
ment talks. Furthermore, to preserve future business relations and
cooperation, the negotiations can be informal and relatively
208. See sources cited infra note 209.
209. See Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in Appellate Proce-
dural Reform, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1209 (1978) (an analysis of the Second Circuit's pre-
hearing conference program); Martin, supra note 80, at 253; Rack, Jr. Pre-Agreement
Conferences in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 921 (1984) (discussing
the Sixth Circuit's prehearing program). A variety of Federal Judicial Center reports
also have dealt with the issue of settlement conferences. See D. Provine, Settlement Strate-
gies for Federal District Judges (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1986); F. Lacey, The judge's Role in the Settlement
of Civil Suits (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1977).
210. D.C. Circuit and U.S. Claims Court Introduce ADR Program to Promote Case Settlement,
19 THIRD BRANCH 1, 9 (June 1987) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit ADR Program].
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nonadversarial. Finally, like arbitration, mediation helps to clear the
courts' overloaded dockets.
There, however, are some disadvantages. Parties may feel un-
comfortable using mediation in lieu of the formal CDA process. For
example, some fear divulging their case in talks with an adversary
who "lays behind the log" in bad faith. Another drawback of media-
tion is that it can be used simply to draw out the litigation with an
added step. This, however, is not likely to be a major concern in
government contract disputes that already take two to four years.
Ironically, informality, one of the biggest advantages of media-
tion, may be a hindrance in some government contract cases. Agree-
ments between parties reached without the formality of a hearing or
a written opinion may not stand up to rigorous review. They may be
criticized for having less documentation or for not conforming ex-
actly with certain precedent. Government negotiators justifiably are
reluctant to settle a case with the knowledge that the informal proce-
dure, and their performance, may not survive a legalistic review by
the agency or a court. Contractors share the similar fear that they
are wasting their time and money if other parts of the government
will not accept the settlement. Though many of these problems can
be corrected, many parties to contract litigation simply may be more
comfortable with a more formalistic proceeding than with
mediation.
Even given the foregoing concerns, mediation definitely de-
serves greater use in contract disputes. The best place to begin im-
plementing mediation is with the boards. First, a scarcity of
supergradejudge slots may make staff mediators attractive. Second,
many current judges would benefit from this mediation training. At
a minimum, boards should encourage mediation training and follow
the lead of the District of Columbia Circuit by creating distinguished
panels of available mediators. At a minimum, all boards should
adopt the policies and rules described below which encourage and
make the use of mediation possible.
D. Settlement Judges
1. Current Usage.--"Settlement judges" can be used to en-
courage parties to settle their cases without compromising the par-
ties' ability to engage in subsequent litigation if they are unable to
reach settlement. While some BCA judges have begun taking a
more active posture in encouraging settlement, apparently only the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission have adopted rules for using settle-
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mentjudges.2 t' Under a United States Claims Court policy, parties
to dispute in the court are to be notified at the outset that they may
request a settlement judge to assist them in assessing their posi-
tions, resolving their dispute, or narrowing the issues in contro-
versy. 21 2 The settlement judge is another member of the Claims
Court who works in confidence to guide the parties toward settle-
ment.21 3 If the procedure does not produce an agreement, the case
typically is returned to the presiding judge's docket and the litiga-
tion is to proceed without prejudice toward either party.
2. Benefits.-This approach obviously can save time and
money, though the benefits are difficult to quantify. 21 4 Another ad-
vantage is that parties seeking a sensible "business" solution can
211. See Joseph & Gilbert, supra note 187, at 287-91. In the early 1970s, the NASA
Board's rules provided for appointment of an administrative judge to help the parties
explore settlement. This procedure was discontinued several years ago. Interview with
Judge Carroll Dicus, supra note 194.
212. See generally U.S. Claims Court General Order No. 13 (Apr. 15, 1987), reprinted in
ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 731; D.C. Circuit ADR Program, supra note 210, at 9.
213. The settlement judge's role is subject, of course, to immense variation and is
explored in detail in several studies sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center. See D.
PROVINE, supra note 209; F. LACEY, supra note 209; THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SET-
TLEMENT PROCESS, supra note 209. One illustration, however, may be enlightening. A
United States Magistrate resolved a 1985 Corps of Engineers lawsuit filed in United
States District Court against Allis-Chalmers for loss sustained as a result of recently dis-
covered latent defects in generator coils installed in 1970. United States v. Allis-Chal-
mers, No. 85-C-567-B (N.D. Okla. June 26, 1986). The parties were asked by the
Magistrate to submit five-page summaries a week before the settlement conference, and,
at the conference, were expected to have someone in attendance with either authority to
settle or enough influence that his recommendation would carry substantial weight. At
the conference, the Magistrate had the parties discuss the issues and estimate the litiga-
tion expense they would incur in terms of attorney fees, out-of-pocket costs, and em-
ployee time. He then stated his belief that, while the trial judge would be conservative in
any damages awarded, defendants did have an exposure to liability. The Magistrate
then led the parties through a process of exploring settlement rationales and construct-
ing the "building blocks of settlement."
After this joint settlement conference, the Magistrate then met separately with each
party. Each side frankly discussed the problems with its case, and each party stated its
bottom-line settlement figures. The Magistrate did not reveal to the parties their oppo-
nent's settlement figures. Further, he promised not to develop his recommended settle-
ment amount by splitting the difference between each side's bottom-line amount. The
Magistrate announced his recommended settlement at a final joint session and gave the
parties less than a day to accept the amount. He did not allow counter offers. Unless
both sides accepted, they would not know whether the other agreed to the amount.
Both parties advised the settlement judge the next day that, subject to Department of
Justice approval, the recommended settlement figure was acceptable. This description
is drawn from a memorandum by Rowe C. Wynn, Jr., Assistant Chief, Office of General
Counsel, Corps of Engineers (Aug. 21, 1986) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
214. For an excellent discussion of problems in measuring the costs and benefits of
ADR, see G. BINGHAM, supra note 77.
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benefit from advice on how the case might be decided in court. The
major disadvantage is that a judge's time is being used for some-
thing other than hearing cases. If the case does not settle, the extra
step has engaged the time of two judges, and may, therefore, prove
more inefficient than simply litigating the case to a decision. Also,
some argue, it may be dangerous for ajudicial figure to undertake to
produce settlements on the basis of very limited information. The
influence exhorted by the judge may be disproportionate to his or
her actual knowledge.
3. Mandatory Use of Settlement Judges?-Though agencies should
provide rules for the use of settlement judges, only certain types of
cases and parties will be susceptible to settlement. For this reason,
requiring mandatory settlement conferences in all cases may be too
drastic. If settlement judges were ubiquitous, parties might start
routinely gaming with the settlement conferences as well as trials.
Nonetheless, presiding and chief judges regularly should examine
their dockets and suggest the use of a settlement judge whenever
appropriate, since parties often are hesitant to raise the prospect of
a settlement themselves for fear of appearing "weak." A judge,
however, quite effectively can focus parties' attentions on their mu-
tual interests. If they do nothing else, boards always should inform
the parties that they may request a settlement judge.21 5
E. Arbitration
1. Defined.-Arbitration is a flexible procedure in which the
disputants present their cases to a neutral third party.216 This neu-
tral third party, usually selected by mutual agreement, hears the evi-
dence and decides the award. Arbitration may be binding or
nonbinding. If binding, the parties must abide by the arbitrator's
award unless a party appeals. Appeals, however, can be taken only
under a highly circumscribed standard of review.217 If nonbinding,
the parties are free to accept or refuse the arbitrator's recom-
mended decision. 218 Arbitration typically is initiated in one of three
215. See 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.86-3, .86-7 (1989).
216. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (1985); Behre, Arbitration:
A Permissible or Desirable Method for Resolving Disputes Involving Federal Acquisition and Assist-
ance Contracts?, 16 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 66, 70 (1986), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 378.
217. Harter, supra note 77, at 165, 210-15, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note
70, at 341-46 (agency may review decision to determine that it is not the result of any
fraud, partiality, or other misconduct).
218. Id. at 176 (not reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK).
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ways: (1) the parties agree before a conflict arises to submit all dis-
putes to arbitration; (2) the parties agree to submit to arbitration
after the dispute arises; or (3) a court, agency, or statute mandates
that the dispute be arbitrated.21 9
2. Procedure and Experience.-The exact procedure for present-
ing the case depends upon the arbitration agreement between the
parties, but it invariably involves an arbitrator who hears evidence
and renders an award. The procedure is informal, with limited dis-
covery and relaxed evidentiary rules. 22 0 An arbitrator's award is
usually a one or two sentence conclusion. As opposed to a lengthy
opinion issued by a judge, at most the arbitrator's decision will be
accompanied by an abbreviated review of facts and the legal basis
for the opinion. The arbitrator usually has technical knowledge of
the area, and often has a legal background. He or she renders the
decision pursuant to a standard chosen by the parties. This may be
simply the law of a certain jurisdiction, the provisions of the con-
tract, or even the arbitrator's own sense of justice.
3. Advantages and Disadvantages.-Arbitration is useful particu-
larly when the parties have an ongoing business relation, as with the
government and most contractors. The expedited process ideally
will save the parties significant time and money. Since discovery is
often curtailed and the hearing itself can be simpler than a judicial
hearing employing all the rules of evidence, an arbitration proceed-
ing often takes less time and money than a traditional trial. More-
over, the use of an expert cuts down on the time needed to educate
the decision-maker on the technical issues. This, in turn, may lead
to a more well-informed decision. Arbitration also does not have to
be a public procedure, thus allowing the parties to protect trade
secrets. Lastly, due to the limited scope of review, arbitration
awards enjoy greater finality than most judicial or agency decisions.
The main disadvantage of this technique is that occasionally exten-
sive procedures are involved, resulting in a procedure which is
nearly as slow and costly as a formal adjudication.
While many government contract disputes would seem well
suited to arbitration, it has not yet been adopted. An Interdepart-
mental Board created in 1921 by the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget to standardize government contract forms considered, but
rejected, both the establishment of a central appeals board and the
219. Id. at 182, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 311.
220. Behre, supra note 216, at 71, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 379.
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use of arbitration in contractors' appeals from the decisions of con-
tracting officers. 22 1 The objections to these processes included the
apparent need for authorizing legislation and that the department
head would be deprived of the control necessary to discharge his
statutory responsibilities. 22 2 During World War II, arbitration again
was considered.2 2 3 Instead, agency boards were developed.
Several obstacles have prevented the use of arbitration to re-
solve government contract disputes. In 1981, the Interior Board
ruled that agencies cannot submit contract disputes to arbitration
224
when the contract's dispute clause requires otherwise. A more
long-standing roadblock has been a series of opinions by the Comp-
troller General. Under these decisions, the government cannot be
bound by arbitration unless the agency specifically is authorized by
statute to engage in arbitration or the arbitration is limited to fact-
finding.2 25 Finally, Articles II and III of the Constitution may re-
strict some government uses of arbitration.2 2 6 In most cases, how-
ever, agencies and Congress should be able to safeguard the process
to avoid these problems.
In addition to these legal obstacles, there are some practical
problems with arbitration. Because arbitrations are not always well
documented and are less subject to public scrutiny, they lack some
221. Shedd, supra note 8, at 48.
222. See id. at 48-49.
223. See Id. at 49-50.
224. Dames and Moore, Inc., IBCA No. 1308-10-79, 81-2 BCA 76, 393 (Oct. 27,
1981).
225. This view allowing for limited use of arbitration is based largely on a fear that
arbitrators who are not well informed on government appropriations and expenditure
laws may make improper decisions. The Administrative Conference of the United States
and many others have criticized this view and have urged Congress to overturn it. See 1
C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1989); Harter, supra note 77, at 165, 191-95 (1986), reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 309; see also Behre, supra note 216, at 66, 67, reprinted in
ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 371, 375 (examining whether binding arbitration is
a "permissible and more desirable" alternative to the resolution system of the CDA);
Hardy & Cargill, Resolving Government Contracts Disputes: Why Not Arbitrate?, 34 FED. B.J. 1,
3 (1975) (examining the "desirability, legality, and feasibility" of private arbitration to
resolve government contract disputes), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at
351, 353. One report argues convincingly that GAO's objections are without legal foun-
dation and are unpersuasive. Berg, Legal and Structural Obstacles to the Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Federal Programs, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS (Sept. 1987).
226. See Bruff, The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, in ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 533 (May 1987).
The questions presented by Bruff are whether Article II and Article III of the United
States Constitution, addressing the executive power of the President and the judicial
power of the federal courts, respectively, are infringed upon by arbitration. See also 1
C.F.R. §§ 305.80-3, .87-5 (1989).
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of the "quality control" of trials. Arbitral awards, some fear, may
not always accurately reflect the merits of the case, e.g., when the
arbitrator simply decides to split the difference between the parties.
Another potential disadvantage is that arbitration generally does
not establish precedent. Therefore, extensive use of arbitration may
lead to some loss of uniformity. Finally, and probably most impor-
tantly, the parties may be reluctant to arbitrate because the scope of
judicial review of awards is limited and they may be bound by an
unsatisfactory and unappealable decision.
Many federal contract cases, however, are, on their face, good
candidates for arbitration. These include cases in which: (1) the
standard to be applied already has been established by statute, pre-
cedent, or rule; (2) the resolution of the dispute need not have prec-
edential effect or establish major new policies; (3) the parties want
the arbitrator to base his or her decision on some general standard
without regard to a prevailing norm; (4) it would be valuable to have
a decision-maker with technical, in addition to legal, knowledge; or(5) the parties desire privacy. 227 Allowing arbitrators to make many
of these decisions would allow BCAjudges and the Claims Court to
focus their managerial and decisional skills on significant cases with
precedential or policy implications.
F. Disputes Review Boards
1. Army Corps of Engineers Model.-The South Atlantic Division
of the Army Corps of Engineers has developed an ADR procedure
to attempt to resolve factual, as opposed to legal, contract disputes
at the contracting officer level.228 The government and the contrac-
tor may agree at the time the contract is signed to create a Disputes
Review Board that is to review factual disputes arising under the
contract. This Board consists of three members, one each repre-
senting the government and the contractor, and a third chosen by
agreement of the parties.2 29 A contractor who is dissatisfied with a
contracting officer's preliminary opinion may either request a final
opinion, which can then be appealed, or submit the dispute to the
Disputes Review Board, with the consent of the government.230
227. See I C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1989), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at
113.
228. Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, South Atlantic Division, Imple-
mentation of Alternative Contract Disputes Resolution Procedure (May 1986) [hereinaf-
ter South Atlantic Procedure], reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 721.
229. Id., reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 726.
230. Id., reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 727-28.
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If the parties agree to submit the dispute to the Disputes Re-
view Board, they must do so within thirty days of the receipt of the
contracting officer's preliminary opinion. 23' At the hearing, both
parties present evidence on the dispute to the Board.232 The Board
then has thirty days to make a factual recommendation.233 If the
parties accept the Board's recommendation, the dispute is consid-
ered settled and the government expeditiously will make any re-
quired contract modifications. If the parties do not accept the
recommendation, the usual dispute resolution procedures are
followed.234
2. Advantages.-Because this procedure effectively takes care
of disputes early in the process, the parties save both time and
money and the BCA's docket is kept clear. It further saves time by
creating the Board before any disputes arise. The Board members
are kept up to date on the construction so that they already are ac-
quainted with the project and do not have to be educated on the
issues when and if a dispute does arise. Finally, the Disputes Review
Board system addresses the statutory and constitutional problems of
ADR by making the Board merely advisory and limiting it to factual
disputes.
3. Drawbacks.-Allowing the parties to second-guess the con-
tracting officer is a drawback of the procedure. The parties are enti-
tled essentially to disregard the contracting officer's opinion,
perhaps without legal authority to do so. Another potential prob-
lem relates to retaining the neutrals. It may not be economically
feasible to keep one or more readily accessible. Review Boards
would be more helpful in large contracts where keeping that individ-
ual abreast of the circumstances is a relatively minor expense as
compared to the potential claim size.
G. Summary Procedure
1. Definition and Description.-Summary procedures for small
claims are another alternative to litigation before BCAs. The "accel-
erated" and "expedited" processes authorized by the CDA permit
abbreviated resolution of small claims. 235 These processes have had
231. Id., reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 724.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. The Act requires BCAs to provide for accelerated disposition of cases for claims
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some utility, but their monetary limits are too low for them to have a
major impact.
2. Examples.-A Navy policy authorizes resolution of small
cases singly or in groups via a summary ASBCA process that can be
binding. It requires contracting officers, "where appropriate, [to]
afford contractors pursuing disputes of $25,000 or less the opportu-
nity to utilize the Summary Binding ASBCA Procedure. ' ' 2 36 "Prece-
dential" cases are excluded. 23 '7 According to the Navy policy,
participation is voluntary.23 8 If the parties do agree to participate,
they also must waive their right to appeal under the CDA.2 39 Under
this binding procedure, each party has a limited amount of time,
usually one to two hours, in which to present its case to a single
BCAjudge, who renders a decision from the bench immediately fol-
lowing the presentations.2 40
Ideally, a judge would be able to hear numerous such cases in
just a few days. This would help clear the BCA's docket. For exam-
ple, John Turnquist, Chief Litigation Counsel for the Navy, has pro-
posed organizing a settlement week in which seven or eight judges
dispose of 70-100 cases in summary proceedings. 241 The BCA's
docket would decrease dramatically as a result.
3. Advantages and Disadvantages.-As illustrated by the above
discussion, the advantages of a summary process are readily appar-
ent. The chief drawback similarly is recognizable. This procedure
uses already overloaded BCAjudges to resolve the cases. Consider-
able debate exists over whether it is better to use a week of a judge's
time to resolve ten small cases than to let those cases wallow in liti-
242gation. The principal problem of this proposal is simply that a
"settlement week" is very hard to schedule, and anything less may
be inefficient.
of $50,000 or less, and to establish expedited simplified procedures for disputes of
$10,000 or less. 41 U.S.C. §§ 607(f), 608(a) (1982).
236. Memorandum from Everett Pyatt, supra note 129 (discussing the Navy's ADR
Program). It also provides that a decision by a contracting officer requiring a full trial
shall be reviewed. Id.
237. Id.
238. Navy ADR Program, supra note 126, at 367, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 848.
239. Id. at 369, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 850.
240. Id. at 368-69, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 849-50.
241. Interview with John Turnquist, supra note 124.
242. Another criticism is that the summary procedure is merely a thinly veiled attempt
to engage in arbitration which may be prohibited statutorily. This attack, however, is
without foundation since the decision-makers remain BCA judges.
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H. Case Management
1. Benefits.-"ADR techniques in the hands of judges, no mat-
ter how well-trained and well-intended, will not significantly reduce
cost or delay nor enhance litigant satisfaction unless they are pre-
mised upon a system that encourages and effectuates judicial man-
agement. ' 243  Keeping track of caseloads and focusing parties'
efforts help to create a "culture" in which timeliness, rather than
extensions, becomes the norm and not the exception. Both the Ad-
ministrative Conference and the American Bar Association's Public
Contracts Section have called for greater use of case manage-
ment.2 4 4 The Federal Trade Commission, for instance, has adopted
a mandatory "fast-track" rule for all cases pending before its admin-
istrative judges. Under this rule, before a party files a petition or
motion it must have made a good faith effort to settle the case or at
least to narrow the issues. 245 Prior to the required scheduling con-
ference, the parties exchange nonbinding statements of claims and
defenses. The administrative judge then sets a trial date for no
more than six months from the time of the scheduling
conference.24 6
2. Experience.-The Grant Appeals Board (GAB) of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services uses an even more interven-
tionist case management model.2 47  For example, the Board
consolidates appeals involving common questions of law or fact so
that a single hearing will suffice for all.248 Additionally, the Board
periodically will give specific procedural directions to the parties to
help them speed up the process. 249 The Boards also may ask a party
to clarify an argument or position if it is not clear to the judge, or to
submit further factual or legal evidence to help develop the rec-
ord. 25" Following up on such issues, the judge frequently will use
243. GOVERNOR'S ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WORKING GROUP, DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION IN MASSACHUSETrS 32 (Nov. 1986).
244. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-7 (1989); Churchill, supra note 68, at 163 (noting American
Bar Association's Public Contract Law Section's concern that the CDA mandate was not
being fulfilled).
245. Berreby, FTC Adopts Mandatory 'Fast Track' Rule for ALJ Cases, 3 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIGATION 5, 15 (Nov. 1985), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at
647-48.
246. Id. at 16, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 649.
247. See Cappalli, Model for Case Management: The Grant Appeals Board, in ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 663 (1986).
248. Id. at 720.
249. Id. at 722.
250. Id. at 723-24.
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written questions as the framework for the hearing.25 "Having as-
certained the factual and legal ambiguities in each side's case by
careful study of the briefs and documentation submitted, the Mem-
ber will ordinarily structure the conference or hearing as a forum for
addressing these ambiguities.' '252
3. Approaches.-Another method of case management is to
have the judge formulate the issues to be decided. The judge
should do this early in the litigation rather than allowing the issues
to emerge slowly during the pretrial phase. GAB members also em-
ploy warnings and sanctions to encourage compliance with time lim-
its, and issue orders to show cause why a sanction should not be
imposed or a preliminary finding not finalized. Another tactic is to
encourage as many stipulations of fact as possible. This often forces
parties to recognize the merits of their cases, and occasionally pres-
sures parties to concede certain points, or even entire claims. On
occasion, to aid in an informed decision, the Board specifically in-
vites the parties to brief particularly complicated or important issues
of law. Sometimes a party knows that it will lose its appeal because
of a governing precedent and simply wants to exhaust its adminis-
trative remedy as quickly as possible so that it may bring suit in fed-
eral court. In such cases, the GAB is perfectly willing and able to
issue a one or two paragraph summary decision.
Many of these case management techniques currently are being
implemented at a few boards to speed up the resolution of govern-
ment contract disputes. These approaches, however, require signifi-
cant time and energy that BCA judges do not have. Case
management also posits an active judicial role in framing cases for
litigation that some may feel to be inappropriate and which may
even hinder justice. As these perspectives make clear, case manage-
ment should not become a fetish. The trend in federal district
courts, nevertheless, clearly is in favor of instituting these methods.
Given the likelihood of continued growth in caseloads and stable
board sizes, case management may become a necessary tool for all
boards.253
251. Id. at 724.
252. Id.
253. Besides the Cappalli report, a 1983 study for the Administrative Conference by
Charles Pou and Charlotte Jones examined the varying ways in which several agencies
have made use of some of these devices. Pou & Jones, Agency Time Limits as a Tool for
Reducing Regulatory Delay, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REC-
OMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 835 (1987). This report, and the cases and articles it dis-
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III. IMPLEMENTING ADR IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACT APPEALS
A. When Does ADR Work Best?
1. Appropriate Issues.-ADR has resolved a broad range of tech-
nical, monetary, and responsibility questions between contractors
and procurement agencies. A variety of contracts and issues have
been involved in cases which have used the minitrial format. For
example, the first case using a minitrial involved a dispute regarding
a highly technical satellite communications system at NASA. 2 5 4 The
Army Corps of Engineers minitrials have involved disputes over a
variety of construction problems. 55 The Navy's first two minitrials
involved both auditing and legal issues with the same contractor
(the specifics of which have remained confidential among the par-
ties).256 The third involved an overhead cost allocation suit.257 The
Department of Energy minitrial dealt with a subcontractor's claim
based on "delays due to government changes in the project.- 258
All dispute cases potentially are appropriate for ADR use, ex-
cept those which clearly are dependent on legal issues. 259 The
Corps "Tenn-Tom" minitrial showed that ADR techniques can be
used effectively even when highly complex issues are in dispute. 260
ADR, if implemented properly, is a useful alternative to litigation in
the resolution of contract claims disputes in the following situations:
(1) when there is a close factual question as to entitlement, and
there are experts who support both the government's and contrac-
tor's position; (2) when agreement has been reached as to entitle-
ment, but the parties cannot agree on quantum; and (3) when legal
or technical staff presents an overzealous assessment of the govern-
ment's position. The minitrial can demonstrate to the contracting
officer or other principal the weaknesses, as well as strengths, of the
government's position. This enables the contracting officer to bet-
cusses, suggest that agencies possess the authority to develop and enforce criteria for
ensuring expeditious disposition of cases by ALJs and BCA judges.
254. See Appeals Board Judges' Conference Explores ADR Applicability, supra note 163, at 33.
255. Id.
256. Interview with John Turnquist, supra note 124.
257. Id.
258. Complex Construction Dispute Settled by First Energy Board Mini-Trial, I Alt. Dis. Res.
Rep. (BNA) 45 (May 14, 1987).
259. Interview with Paul Killian, Esq., Watt, Tieder, Killian, Toole & Hoffar (July 10,
1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review). Mr. Killian has participated in, and writ-
ten on use of minitrials in contract disputes.
260. DoD Deputy IG Endorses Alternative Dispute Resolution, FED. AcQuiSITION REP., Aug.
1987, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter DoD Deputy](DerekJ. Vander Schaaf's comments at Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States ADR Colloquium).
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ter assess the merits of the claim.26'
Substantively, the cases most often cited as appropriate for min-
itrial resolution are: (1) differing site disputes in which the parties
disagree on the conditions of the site; (2) disputes arising from the
agency changing the work required under the contract; (3) defects
in contract specifications with which the contractor finds impossible
to comply; 26 2 (4) defective pricing audits; 26 3 and (5) disputes over
construction and ship repair contracts. The minitrial process, how-
ever, would not be useful when contractor fraud is alleged.
2. Case Size.-The argument can be made that there is some
minimum amount of controversy below which the value of the mini-
trial is exceeded by costs. Because ADR options are at such an ex-
perimental stage, quantitative evaluations of this nature would have
a weak empirical foundation. It would be very difficult to compare
the costs of ADR to the costs of going directly to the board or court.
These three dispute resolution arenas are too diverse to make
meaningful comparisons. It also is difficult to assess whether and
how a dispute settled by ADR might have been settled otherwise.
Therefore, the size at which the case is deemed appropriate for ADR
settlement is hard to pinpoint. This determination is best left to
parties of a particular dispute. While agencies might want to set up
some standards, these should be flexible given the possible
variations.
3. Timing.-To curtail discovery, the chief cause of expense
and delay, one should agree to ADR sooner rather than later.26 In
addition, the sooner in the process the parties get together to nego-
tiate, the less rigid they likely are to be when discussing their cases,
and the greater the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable set-
tlement. Another related consideration, especially for the govern-
ment, is the reaction of the staff. The longer a team has been
preparing and conducting discovery on a case, the less willing its
members may be to accept a quick settlement decision because they
will feel more knowledgeable about the dispute than the
261. Memorandum from Major Northrop, Assistant District Counsel, Corps of Engi-
neers (Dec. 20, 1984) (after-action report, ASBCA Minitrial No. 28767) (copy on file
with Maryland Law Review).
262. See Federal Reclamation Bureau Soon to Adopt an ADR Policy, 5 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIGATION I (Feb. 1987), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 591.
263. See DoD Deputy, supra note 260, at 1, col. 1.
264. See, e.g., Killian & Mancini, Mini-Trials-Basic Principles and Guidelines, CONSTRUC-
TION BRIEFINGS Mar. 1985, at 4.
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principal .265
Minitrials have been conducted at all stages of the appeals pro-
cess. Some have taken place before the parties responded to initial
interrogatories, a number have occurred after significant discovery,
and one, the above-mentioned Boecon case, took place after a six-
week Board hearing.266 Minitrials also may be conducted even
before a final decision is reached by the contracting officer, or after
the decision, but before an appeal is filed. Since cases typically pres-
ent several settlement opportunities as they progress, regular review
can help find apt subjects for ADR.
Thought certainly should be given to using ADR at the con-
tracting officer level. While the present study focuses on the ap-
peals level, there is no contradiction between employing these
methods at both the contracting officer and the BCA stages.2 67
Contracting officers settling more cases would alleviate the backlogs
at the BCAs. 268 The earlier that disputed contractual issues are
brought to the contracting officer's attention, the sooner they can be
resolved. 69 Parties often would be less entrenched and more cog-
nizant of what the dispute is about in the first place. This would
enable them to deal with their problems directly and promptly. For
these reasons, many have suggested implementing ADR before
cases get to the boards.270
265. This happened in the Corps' Tenn-Tom case, in which an unhappy staff member
used the "hotline" to request an Inspector General's investigation into the process and
settlement. See Ruttinger, supra note 140; Report of Investigation, Tennessee Tombig-
bee Claim Settlement, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Special
Inquiries (July 29, 1986), cited in Page & Lees, Roles of Participants in the Mini-Trial, 18 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 54, 69 n.40 (1988).
266. See Complex Construction Dispute Settled by First Energy Board Mini-Trial, supra note
258, at 45.
267. The only drawback to simultaneous minitrials at these two levels would be the
appearance of a duplication of effort. Some agencies might not be able to fiscally justify
such a dual effort.
268. Interview with Louis Spector, Retired Chairman of the ASBCA, and Retired Se-
niorJudge of the United States Claims Court (June 17, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland
Law Review).
269. Interview with Eleanor R. Spector, DoD Procurement (July 31, 1987) (copy on
file with Maryland Law Review).
270. See Memorandum from Major Northrop, supra note 261. The report of the Com-
mission on Government Procurement recommended a new level of claim consideration
at which an informal review would occur in any case in which a contracting officer's
decision was adverse to the contractor. The review would have allowed the agency to
correct or amend some contracting officer's decisions before the contractor commenced
litigation, and would have focused on the contracting officer's justification for the ad-
verse decision and settlement possibilities. Contracting officer's decisions were to be
submitted to a high level agency official, who was not involved in the contract's adminis-
tration, for purposes of injecting an element of neutrality into the attempted settlement.
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Some observers, seeing an erosion in recent years of many con-
tracting officers' managerial authority, wonder whether this would
inhibit the willingness of contracting officers to go out on a limb by
negotiating a compromise. Contracting officers need their agencies
behind them on these decisions. 271' A recent American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) report states:
[T]he contracting officer should have the authority to
fulfill the mission of contracting in the most efficient and
economical way, while assuring that the spirit and intent of
the law is faithfully implemented .... Rather than stimulat-
ing efficiency, initiative and imagination, the current [DoD]
acquisition environment blankets the contracting officer
with oversight, laws and regulations. The magnitude of
new laws and regulations has thrown a shadow on the con-
tracting officer's authority, and the pace of change is too
swift to be effectively absorbed and implemented .... In
this atmosphere of intense oversight and close regulation,
correct procedure becomes more important than substan-
tive success in acquisition. Contracting officers can be so
confined by compliance with regulations . . . that they are
afraid to express ideas and afraid to act beyond their famil-
iar routines. . . . [C]onstant changes in laws and regula-
tions serve to neutralize the value of past training in
contracting procedure.272
One way to involve the contracting officer in the minitrial is to
make the contracting officer the government's principal. If the min-
itrial takes place before the contracting officer's decision, the con-
tracting officer could present the settlement as his decision. On the
other hand, if the minitrial occurs after the contracting officer's deci-
sion, the contracting officer always could change his mind and re-
consider his decision. If both parties are satisfied with the
settlement and the contracting officer's subsequent decision, no one
should complain about improper influence. Minitrials seem to pres-
ent far fewer concerns of improper influence on contracting officers.
Skeptics, however, may wonder if informal advice from a BCAjudge
The report also suggested that the parties hold a conference prior to the contracting
officer's decision. Congress deleted the notion of a settlement conference because it
would undermine the negotiating position of the contracting officer.
271. Interview with Louis Spector, supra note 268.
272. Bednar & Jones, supra note 44, at 5-6.
273. According to Robert T. Peacock, "[t]he [contracting officer] may reconsider or
amend a decision even after a timely appeal has been taken." R. PEACOCK, A COMPLETE
GUIDE TO THE CONTRACT DISPUTEs ACT 40 (1986).
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acting as a neutral can be disregarded.274
B. Negotiating and Living with ADR Settlements
1. The Negotiation Process.-During settlement negotiations, the
principals typically meet alone to weigh the merits of the case and
discuss areas of compromise. Many will have been advised by their
technical advisors and counsel on the legal issues, advised by ex-
perts on technical issues, advised by auditors on the quantum as-
pects of the case, and advised by the neutral advisor on the merit of
the case and the probable outcome at trial. No transcripts are kept
of these proceedings. At most, intra-agency documents are pre-
pared after the fact, explaining and justifying the outcome and per-
haps describing the process for evaluative purposes.2 7 5
2. Review or Approval of Settlements.-There generally is no fol-
low-up review of the ADR settlement. To be principals, the repre-
sentatives must have prior authority from their agencies to settle the
case. They must have the confidence that their agencies will support
their decision to settle the case with the best interest of the govern-
ment in mind. One dispute settlement was brought to the attention
of the agency inspector general by an agency subordinate who be-
lieved that the agency's principal had given in too easily in the mini-
trial negotiations. The inspector general's report generally
endorsed the process. The inspector general determined that the
parties in this case acted in the best interest of the government, but,
in the future, greater justification should be provided for settlement
decisions.276
An inspector general can perform its role of preserving ac-
countability without intruding into the ADR settlement process. In-
spector general reviews of these activities should be approached
274. Pacific Architects & Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 491 F.2d 734 (Ct. Cl. 1974),
concerns a contracting officer's decision which the plaintiffs alleged was unduly influ-
enced by the legal advice of a government lawyer. Id. at 744-46. Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) § 33.21 l(a)(2), promulgated in 1983, states that the contracting of-
ficer "shall . . . [s]ecure assistance from legal and other advisors." 48 C.F.R.
§ 33.21 l(a)(2) (1988). Thus, a contracting officer should be allowed to get advice from
the BCA member acting as a neutral. Another case, Kiewit Sons' Co. v..United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 714 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1983), addressed the issue of congres-
sional pressure on a contracting officer, and found the mere existence of such pressure,
without proof of effect on the outcome, enough to vacate a decision. Id. at 170.
275. Interview with Frank Carr, supra note 151.
276. The only other post-settlement agency reviews have been evaluations of their
ADR programs and policies. This general assessment is useful to policymakers seeking
to improve the process, and should help assure that the government's interest is served.
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with caution, as excessive postreview of settlement outcomes could
undermine the potential for further use. Arguably, however, some
communication between the principal and the auditors for the
agency (e.g., Defense Contract Audit Agency) prior to the actual ini-
tiation of the procedures occasionally may be useful. For example,
the auditors might, on request, review a case that an agency has
deemed appropriate for settlement. They could provide quantum
data for the principals to assist with the settlement process. The
auditors also may offer guidance on appropriate levels of documen-
tation for settlements, taking into account considerations of both ac-
countability and flexibility.
In some cases, Congress also may second-guess settlement de-
cisions. An extreme example is Blackhawk Heating and Plumbing Co. v.
United States, 7 7 in which Congress questioned the settlement, urged
the VA Administrator not to pay it, and ultimately forbade payment
of the full settlement amount. 278 Agencies must act carefully with
ADR to avoid indefensible settlements and to provide oversight en-
tities with an accurate view of the costs and benefits of their ADR
uses. At the same time, however, members of Congress also must
assume responsibility for a level of review that recognizes the trans-
action costs of formal adjudication and the need for compromise in
many disputes.
3. Documentation.-The agency ADR procedure in nearly all
cases should require some brief documentation providing justifica-
tion for the settlement reached. This would improve accountability,
especially for cases involving large dollar amounts, and ultimately
would lessen the probability of any investigation. This need for ra-
tional settlement must be balanced with ADR's primary appeal of
informality. The assurance of privacy in the negotiation process
also is essential. If the details of the negotiation process are to be-
come common knowledge, criticism from both sides might increase
and inhibit future negotiations. If the process becomes too open,
the incentive for using ADR will disappear.
The level of documentation necessary will depend on for whom
it is being created. If it is created for oversight on the part of indi-
viduals outside of the agency, not much detail is necessary. If it is
created for in-house use, as is more likely, the level of detail in-
creases dramatically. The principal or his or her advisor should set
277. 622 F.2d 539 (Ct. C1. 1980).
278. Id. at 544-45. For a discussion of the case in connection with using BCA judges
as minitrial neutrals, see supra note 189.
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down cost and other factors taken into consideration, any prenego-
tiation positions developed, and a statement justifying acceptance of
the compromise. In sum, the report should encompass a reflection
of the thought process or rationale of government officials who
agreed to the settlement. This documentation need not significantly
exceed what ordinarily would be used to justify negotiated settle-
ments of government contract disputes. A price negotiation memo-
randa typically would be adequate. This justification memorandum
should be written after the fact so that ongoing negotiations are not
jeopardized or delayed. The neutral could help the parties draw up
the justification memo, or even offer an advisory decision in a poten-
tially sensitive case.279
C. Agency Policies
Despite the apparent initial success of ADR procedures, wide-
spread use has not resulted. One possible explanation for the slow
incorporation of ADR is that most public officials are adverse to
change. Lessening the backlog of cases often is not enough of an
incentive for officials to risk a new procedure by using ADR tools.
Innovative policies must therefore balance a variety of interests and
concerns. These include the parties' needs to resolve disputes effi-
ciently so that personnel and resources can be refocused on more
pressing matters, i.e., maintenance of positive ongoing relation-
ships, finality in decisions, needs for accountability, and procedural
fairness.
The simplest way for an agency or board to introduce ADR in
the contracts litigation process is to write and distribute a policy
which encourages contracting officers and BCA judges to explore
ADR. It should state clearly that high-level agency officers, or the
board, support such initiatives and place the responsibility for im-
plementing these policies or rules with contracting officers, govern-
ment counsel, and judges. Further, OFPP should encourage
development of such advice. Finally, a presidential executive order
and changes in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to en-
courage ADR also would' be warranted.
An ADR policy can give both government officials and private
contractors the encouragement they need to experiment with these
techniques. One consideration, which may prevent parties from us-
ing any kind of ADR, is the possibility that one's opponent may view
279. Interview with Derek J. Vander Schaaf, DoD Acting Inspector General (May 27,
1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
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a willingness to settle as a sign of weakness. An agency can avoid
this problem by making it a policy to review systematically all cases
for settlement potential. This policy should thus make it clear that
not all cases need be litigated. Such a policy will convince contrac-
tors that choosing to settle rather than to litigate a case is often a
sign of reasonableness, and that responsible agency officials will
support settlements reached via duly selected ADR methods.
Persons who are experienced or familiar with ADR's potential
success should perform an ADR susceptibility review. Many agen-
cies, however, do not have such individuals. The BCA is an appro-
priate place to start such an endeavor because these judges are most
familiar with different types of disputes and with managing the
docket caseload.
The policy statements of the Corps, the Navy, the Justice De-
partment, and the Claims Court essentially outline their recom-
mended ADR procedures.2"' The policies, emphasizing the
voluntary nature of the procedures, eschew strict guidelines, and do
not require anything in particular to be done. What they do estab-
lish is who has authority to approve the selection of a case for ADR
consideration. These policies offer guidelines on many of the issues
discussed in the previous sections of this study, i.e., case selection,
representatives, neutrals, and the nature of the agreement process
and negotiation. The guidelines usually are fairly loose and allow
the parties to design a procedure most appropriate for the particular
case. For example, the South Atlantic Division of the Corps of Engi-
neers has its own minitrial policy, in addition to that of the Corps.2"'
Yet, in Granite Construction, the parties combined elements of the two
policies into a third kind of ADR procedure.282
In formulating a specific policy, one must ask what roles the
agency's BCA and contracting officers should play in the minitrial or
other ADR process. The aim of ADR is to avoid litigation. There-
280. See United States Claims Court, General Order No. 13 and Notice to Counsel on
Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques (Apr. 15, 1987), reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 731; Circular on ADR, supra note 108, reprinted in ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 703; Memorandum from John Lehman, supra note 125,
reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at 847; Memorandum from Stuart E. Schif-
fer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Division, to the Attorneys of the Commer-
cial Litigation Branch (June 19, 1986) (discussing ADR and attaching a statement of
policy regarding the use of minitrials), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at
827.
281. See South Atlantic Procedure, supra note 228, reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 70, at 721.
282. See Pou, Federal Agency Use of ADR: The Experience to Date, in CONTAINING LEGAL
COSTS, supra note 108, at 225.
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fore, it would be logical to implement minitrials before the BCA is
even involved in the case. 283 This saves the parties time, clears the
board's docket for cases which should be litigated, and avoids some
possible formalism and institutionalization which the board might
impose. The policy should ensure that control over the structure of
the ADR process is not transferred from the parties to the judge.284
A policy implemented by the board, however, may imbue the pro-
cess with added legitimacy in the eyes of inspector generals and
Congress. Furthermore, the board's formal approval of a settle-
ment finalizes the issue, and will protect it from second-guessing by
the agency or Congress. Finally, in the interest of preserving their
independence, judges may well prefer to issue their own policy
rather than have one imposed upon them.285
D. Rule Changes
Contracting agencies and their BCAs also should consider
changing their rules of practice to encourage the use of ADR. While
agencies should be careful not to over institutionalize ADR, there
should be a rule that requires contracting officers to alert appellants
of ADR possibilities. This would ensure that the parties realize the
availability of the ADR alternative. In many disputes, this may be all
the parties need to commence a process leading to settlement. If
ADR is chosen early in a case, the savings would be dramatic. In the
long run, rule changes to encourage the use of ADR could play a
significant role in making these techniques a more common and ac-
cepted procedure.
There, however, are some drawbacks to innovating through
rule changes. Adoption of a new rule can be extremely laborious.
Some boards, notably the ASBCA, are subject to a burdensome,
high-level, sign-off procedure. Furthermore, rules often lead to un-
wanted formalism. Parties often adhere only to the letter of the law,
and will demand explicit authority to adopt any procedure which is
not enumerated specifically. Rule changes may not be necessary for
all agencies. In smaller BCAs, in which communication among the
judges and litigants is more direct, the agency's ADR policy may be
better known than at the larger boards. A rule is worth considering,
nonetheless, since it also would indicate an agency commitment to
283. Indeed, arbitration would substitute a private decider in less important, non-
precedential disputes.
284. Interview with Paul Killian, supra note 259.
285. See 41 U.S.C. § 607(b)(1) (1982) (BCA judges are appointed in the same manner
as ALJs).
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procedural innovation. Further, BCAjudges would possess clear au-
thority to encourage ADR. Finally, adopting such a rule would send
a message to contract officials and contractors that the agency en-
courages the use of ADR.
An agency rule on ADR should: (1) authorize and encourage
agency officers to make use of alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion; (2) make provisions for automatically alerting the parties, both
at the contracting officer level and as soon as an appeal is filed, that
one or more ADR methods is available; 2 6 (3) authorize a judge to
encourage its use and to require the attendance of at least one rep-
resentative of each party who has authority to settle all matters at
any conference held for the purposes of proposing or implementing
ADR; (4) briefly describe the alternatives; and (5) authorize the par-
ties to agree to vary any procedural rule in their case. While it is
likely that administrative judges and officials already possess these
powers,287 explicit authorization certainly would allay any existing
doubts.
Changes can be made either to the procedural rules of each in-
dividual agency or board, or to the government-wide central regula-
tions and guidelines. 2 8 The Public Contract Law Section of the
ABA is considering a recommendation to change the ASBCA rules
to authorize the board to call a conference to consider the possibil-
ity of agreement or ADR procedures which might dispose of any or
all of the issues in dispute.28 9 Such an addition to the rules of the
ASBCA or other boards could make a substantial difference in the
resolution of contract disputes.
A more sweeping rule change would allow a BCA judge to im-
pose sanctions on a party for refusing unjustifiably to participate in
286. Many interviewees recommend including a statement on the ADR alternative in
the docketing notice. See, e.g., interview with Judges David Doane and Russell C. Lynch,
Interior BCA (July 17, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review); interview with
Emanuel P. Snyder, Chief Judge, Transportation BCA (May 4, 1987) (copy on file with
Maryland Law Review). The Claims Court has done precisely this in its notice to counsel
explaining the operation of its minitrial and settlement judge policies. See Claims Court
Approves ADRfor Complex Federal Cases, 5 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION 137,
144 (Sept. 1987).
287. Some federal district courts have mandated exploration of ADR use by rule, and
have even made mediation or arbitration mandatory in certain kinds of cases.
288. Strong arguments can be made for issuance at the agency level, as opposed to
the sub-agency (e.g., Corps or Navy) or board level. As a practical matter, though,
agency rules at any level are likely to suffice.
289. ABA Alternate Disputes Resolution Committee of the Section on Public Contract
Law, Draft Recommendations (Apr. 8, 1987) [hereinafter ABA Draft Recommendations]
(covering the use of ADR procedures by the ASBCA).
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settlement efforts. This would mirror some draft legislation and
proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure changes which provide
that sanctions could be imposed on any party who fails to participate
in good faith in any settlement conference. In all likelihood, BCA
members now have the authority to impose sanctions for failure to
participate in good faith once a party has agreed to do so. An ex-
plicit rule should be considered to make that authority clear.
Multinational Legal Services (MLS), a Washington consulting
firm, has taken a different approach. MLS recommended to the
OFPP that the FAR should be changed to encourage settlement
through ADR. MLS proposes adding the following paragraph to
FAR 33.204, which states that it is the government's policy to try to
resolve all contractual disputes by mutual agreement:
Specifically, the contracting officer, before issuing a deci-
sion likely to be unacceptable to the claimant, shall recom-
mend to the non-Government parties and the
representatives of the Government involved in the dispute
that they seek to resolve their differences by methods other
than litigation and that they agree on an alternative method
of dispute resolution (ADR), such as a minitrial, mediation,
arbitration, a settlement judge or administrative judge or
some other neutral person, a two-team settlement process,
or some other method of ADR as promises an agreed reso-
lution of the dispute without the litigation following upon a
decision of the contracting officer on the claim of the non-
Government party.2 90
MLS argues that this regulation change will do three things:
[I]t will unambiguously affirm that ADR is as much or more
the policy of the United States as is litigation .... [I]t in-
troduces ADR at the contracting officer's level-before the
parties have been caught up in a formal 'dispute', with
pleadings, briefs, subpoenas and depositions .... [And]
the benefits of resolution by ADR of many disputes will, in
turn, speed up the progress of those other cases requiring
formal litigation.29 1
The notion of greater OFPP and FAR guidance, which strongly sup-
ports the use of ADR at both the contracting officer and BCA level,
has great merit.
In conclusion, any rule changes should be broad and permis-
290. Letter from David Schwartz to Robert B. Bedell, supra note 46.
291. Id.
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sive. They must neither add more layers to the resolution process,
nor detract seriously from the voluntary nature of ADR.
E. Contract Clauses
Still another means of implementing ADR in the contract pro-
cess is to write a broad ADR clause into government contracts. Such
a clause alerts the parties to the alternative even before a dispute
arises. This may make it easier to initiate and implement the proce-
dure should the need arise. Standard and optional dispute resolu-
tion clauses authorizing ADR should be prepared for agency use. 29 2
F. Statutory Changes
There do not appear to be any major statutory obstacles in the
Administrative Procedure Act or the CDA to using any form of ADR
(except perhaps binding arbitration) 2° 1 to resolve government con-
tract disputes. 29 4  Legislation, however, would give agencies and
boards a strong policy signal, provide an incentive to use ADR, and
eliminate any existing ambiguity as to agency power to engage in
these common sense procedures in resolving disputes. Several other
policy changes may be beneficial. First, contracting officers should
be encouraged to settle cases. Second, as repeatedly recommended
by the Administrative Conference,29 5 Congress should authorize the
use of arbitration in contract disputes at the agency's sound discre-
292. Recently, the Corps' South Atlantic Division inadvertently conducted an experi-
ment of sorts when it accidently inserted a voluntary alternative disputes review process
clause in four solicitations. The Corps had decided not to include the clause for fear
that even though the language specifically provided that the process was voluntary, it
might have resulted in higher bids. Memorandum from Stephen Lingenfelter to Lester
Edelman, supra note 117. For a sample minitrial clause in a contract between private
parties, see Killian & Mancini, supra note 264, at 20.
293. See Berg, supra note 225; Bruff, supra note 226, at 535.
294. See, e.g., letter from David Schwartz to Robert B. Bedell, supra note 46.
We believe that there is no legal obstacle to an ADR solution to a dispute
before or after the contracting officer makes his decision. If it occurs before the
contracting officer's decision, the alternative resolution simply becomes the
contracting officer's decision; if after his decision, it becomes the settlement
agreement with the agency.
Id.
295. The Conference called on Congress to allow agency arbitration in Administrative
Conference Recommendations 86-3 and 87-5. 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.86-3, 87-5 (1989). In
1987, the Administrative Law Section of the ABA approved a resolution virtually identi-
cal to Recommendation 86-3. See Recommendation 86-3: Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of
Dispute Resolution, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS 9 (1986); Recommendation 87-11: Alternative for Resolving Government
Contract Disputes, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS 60 (1987).
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tion.296 At a bare minimum, some consideration should be given in
appropriations decisions to funding for training and outreach pro-
grams because these programs will increase agency use of ADR.
G. Training and Outreach
Training of, and outreach to, the contracting community is vital
to promoting ADR in the government contracts field. Judges and
neutrals should receive training in mediation and other ADR skills
to help facilitate use of these procedures. Agency personnel must
be educated about both the availability of ADR and how to use it
properly. Private contractors must be made aware of alternatives
and assured that these are fair and efficient procedures and are not
just another onerous system of adjudication.
1. Training.-Many BCA judges and the majority of con-
tracting officers do not have adequate training in case management
and mediation to either help them act as a neutral in a minitrial or
even to comprehend fully what ADR encompasses. The Navy, for
example, does not provide any formal training to its personnel, but
discusses the procedure to be followed on a case-by-case basis.
297
Providing training to its personnel should be one of each agency's
priorities.
Judges have a variety of concerns regarding ADR in general and
minitrials specifically. These concerns include resolving disputes as
efficiently and accurately as possible, lessening their caseload, and
preserving their independence and neutrality. Some administrative
judges view ADR with apparent resistance. Many BCA judges are
unwilling to "manage" hearings or to resolve cases in the most ex-
peditious way because they view themselves as onlookers who ulti-
mately may make the decision.29 BCA judges, however, need not
feel like onlookers. They could participate actively by developing
and overseeing any new rules, regulations, or policies on ADR
within their agencies. Efforts must be made to demonstrate that the
short term burden of case ADR review is worth the long term goals
of increased settlements at an expedited pace with a result of better
overall case management.
296. At-the least, parties should be authorized to agree to arbitrate non-precedential
disputes that have arisen. Arbitration clauses in acquisition contracts pose more substan-
tial concerns, and are less clearly desirable.
297. Interview with John Turnquist, supra note 124.
298. Korthals-Altes, The Applicability of Alternate Dispute Resolution Techniques to Govern-
ment Defense Contract Disputes (May 1986), reprinted in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at
147.
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Training for government personnel can be accomplished in a
number of ways. First, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice or others could conduct courses at the agencies, focusing on
whichever ADR method the agency deems appropriate. Private or-
ganizations like the American Arbitration Association and the
Center for Public Resources also could provide valuable training.
The BOCAJA and other professional organizations also could spon-
sor seminars on ADR forjudges. Still another possibility of provid-
ing training is to include ADR in the curriculum at the Defense
Weapons System Management College, and other bodies which
train contract projects managers. The DoD apparently has been
more successful training its contracting officers than many other
agencies, but the General Services Administration is now starting a
contracting officer training program.299 The teaching of ADR skills
easily could be incorporated into these programs.
Each agency should designate a representative as its ADR spe-
cialist. This would help to expedite its ADR development and bet-
ter coordinate implementation. There are a number of issues
involved in the choice of an ADR specialist. These include what part
of the agency the specialist might be from, what type of training or
experience might be required, what the job description might look
like, and how that individual might be compensated. For example,
DoD currently has no central database for tracking contract dis-
putes, and thus is unable to identify types of cases that could be
settled using ADR procedures. 30 0 An agency ADR specialist could
administer such a system to expedite the consideration and imple-
mentation of ADR.
2. Outreach.-Many experts attribute the lack of utilization of
ADR in part to a lack of knowledge of the subject by agency person-
nel and contractors. To combat this ignorance, outreach and public
relations of ADR's benefits is encouraged strongly. Education is a
slow process, and even the most flexible bureaucrats are slow to
change. Even given a general awareness in the procurement com-
munity of ADR, others see institutional impediments to implemen-
tation of these alternatives and maintain that education and
outreach efforts only would have a limited effect. There also is de-
bate as to the source of an ADR outreach program. It is arguable
whether it should come from within the agency as a directive or
from some outside source.
299. Interview with Judges David Doane and Russell C. Lynch, supra note 286.
300. DoD Deputy, supra note 260, at 1.
252 [VOL. 49:183
1990] APPEALING GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS
An agency will have difficulty implementing an ADR policy until
it has educated both its own personnel and private contractors.
Many individuals still are skeptical about ADR, and they must be
shown that these techniques actually have worked. Within the gov-
ernment, the education should be focused on BCA judges, con-
tracting officers, counsel, and auditors. In addition to spreading the
news by word of mouth, agencies could cooperate with other inter-
ested groups to sponsor seminars to educate their personnel on the
uses of ADR. The DoD, for instance, is planning to have the Navy
give a presentation on its minitrial experiences to personnel from
each of the four services.30'
Professional associations and institutions involved in govern-
ment contract disputes (including BOCAJA, the Armed Services
Trial Lawyers Association, and the National Contract Management
Association) would be useful for promoting ADR. 0 2 Private sector
participants in the government contract procurement area similarly
should be active in ADR development. Other outside actors might
want to do follow-up studies and reports of these activities, their
success and limitations. Groups like the National Institute for Dis-
pute Resolution, the Center for Public Resources, Endispute, the
American Arbitration Association, and the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, also could be helpful in ADR education and
training, as these groups have experience in this area.
Conferences or seminars featuring presentations, working
groups, and position papers should be employed to educate people
about ADR processes. Participating groups and agencies should in-
clude the Administrative Conference, the BOCAJA, the Armed
Services Trial Lawyers Association, the Center for Public Resources,
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Public Contract
Law Section of the ABA, the Association of General Contractors,
and the National Contract Management Association. This confer-
ence would be directed at both government personnel and private
contractors.
There also are other ways to reach the private sector. Some-
thing as simple as including an ADR policy statement in the docket-
ing notice could make a big difference. An endorsement of the
process by the ABA also could help legitimize and publicize ADR
among contractors. The ADR Committee of the ABA's Section on
301. Interview with Eleanor R. Spector, supra note 269.
302. Interview with C. Stanley Dees, Chairman, ABA Section on Public Contract Law
(July 24, 1987) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
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Public Contract Law has recommended that the Program Commit-
tee of the Section and its various divisions conduct educational pro-
grams on the Navy's and Corps' ADR procedures.30 3 In these
programs, particular emphasis should be placed on informing and
educating small and medium-sized contractors of the existence of
these alternatives.30 4 The various contractor associations also could
help disseminate information on ADR. A number of minitrials con-
ducted by the government have occurred because the contractors
had heard of minitrials and suggested the possibility to the agencies.
The more highly publicized the alternatives are, the more successful
any program will be.
CONCLUSION
ADR has adapted well to traditional agency decision-making
formats. When these methods have been used, they have worked.
Apparently, these techniques are flexible enough for a variety of or-
ganizational settings. Regulations and policies did not need to be
altered dramatically. As a result, some agencies do not see the need
for an ADR policy. We disagree. Codifying or announcing policies
would create greater awareness of ADR proceedings and enhance
the probability of their utilization.
Agencies should adopt policies promoting and encouraging
ADR techniques on a voluntary basis. An agency policy should en-
courage regular review of cases for susceptibility, with caution not
to undermine the process with excessive regulations and standardi-
zation. The policy should offer advice on how to document the pro-
cess and justify settlements, to protect decisionmakers and allow for
an effective evaluation of these alternatives. Policies should be sup-
plemented with training and outreach efforts on ADR applications.
Whether these efforts will suffice remains to be seen. Without these
kinds of initiatives, government contract disputes will continue to be
handled in a manner that leaves most parties dissatisfied.
303. ABA Draft Recommendations, supra note 289.
304.. Id.
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